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Abstract
This Article will consider the following: Part I will discuss some general issues concern-
ing dispute settlement internationally. Part II discuss dispute settlement systems in the Regional
Economic Groupings, including the World Trade Organization (”WTO”) (as evidenced in the infa-
mous “Banana Dispute”) and the future Free Trade Area of the Americas (”FTAA”), given that the
Revised Treaty will be notified under article XXIV of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
1994 and will presumably be accepted as being consistent with the understanding thereunder. Part
III will examine the Role of the CCJ as the judicial organ of CARICOM and the interplay between
the original and appellate jurisdictions of the CCJ. Part IV will analyze the institutional and juris-
dictional distinctiveness of the CCJ (including its referral procedure) and the features of the CCJ
that make it sui generis. Part V addresses the role of precedent, stare decisis, and the rule of Non
liquet in the regime and their implications for the interface of common law and civil law. Part V
will also include an analysis of the attitude towards precedent at the international level. Finally,
Part VI will discuss locus standi for natural and legal persons and, to a lesser extent, the Advisory
Opinion of the head of jurisdiction.
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INTRODUCTION
Whether one is concerned with the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, the United Nations Conference on
the Environment and Development or the plethora of extant in-
ternational legal regimes, developing countries, including the
Caribbean, are accustomed to contributing in a significant way
to the growth of international law and attempting to secure in-
creasing respect for that law. Now, a grouping of ten small Is-
land States, three mainland States, and one colonial dependency
in the Caribbean has taken actions which will challenge the fron-
tiers of international law.'
The establishment of the Caribbean Court of Justice ("CCJ"
or "the Court") by the Member States of the Caribbean Commu-
nity ("CARICOM") has already begun to contribute to the codifi-
cation and progressive development of international law. At the
present time, its contribution lies in the institutional architec-
ture utilized in the design of the Court and the jurisdictional
tasks assigned to it. In the future, it will be the manner in which
the institution carries out those tasks assigned to it and the man-
ner in which its pivots - the treaty bodies - carry out their
* J.P., LIM, Deputy Permanent Representative of Jamaica, The International Sea-
bed Authority, Special Adviser to Hon. Attorney General, and Project Coordinator of
the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of the Caribbean Court of Justice.
Ronald Burch-Smith, Barrister-at-Law & Consultant to the Caribbean Court Of Justice
Project Unit provided editorial assistance.
1. The Island State Members of the Community are Antigua and Barbuda, The
Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti,Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis,
Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad & Tobago. Caribbean Com-
munity ("CARICOM") Secretariat, Caricom Member States, available at www.caricom.
org/members.htm. The Continental Members are Belize, Guyana and Suriname. Id.
Montserrat is a British Overseas Territory and requires Instruments of Entrustment
from the United Kingdom to participate in the "new" Community. Id. Haiti and Suri-
name are purely civil law countries whereas Saint Lucia, and to a much lesser extent
Grenada, Dominica, and Guyana have vestiges of civil law. Id. At this time, The Baha-
mas does not participate in the integration arrangements. Id. Given the new legal
architecture of an integrated economy and institutional arrangements this is not legally
sustainable. Id.
930
THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
duties, that will ensure its independence and sustainability. In
both the procedural and substantive facets of the corpus of the
law of international organizations and international economic
law (and within both, regional integration law), the CCJ is on
the threshold of taking them to new levels. The CCJ is an entity
sui generis. On the one hand, the Court will serve as the judicial
organ of CARICOM interpreting and applying the rights and ob-
ligations set out in the constituent instrument of the Commu-
nity: the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Including The CAR-
ICOM Single Market and Economy (the Revised Treaty),
("CSME"). 2 In the Court's Original Jurisdiction, it will be an in-
ternational judicial tribunal basing its judgments, advisory opin-
ions, orders, etc., on rules of international law. This will give
flesh to the plethora of new rights and concomitant obligations
granted to and imposed upon the Member States, Community
Organs and Bodies, and most importantly to natural and legal
persons. The Court has the important task of defining the con-
tours and guaranteeing the observance of the law of the Revised
Treaty, thus ensuring its supremacy, facilitating uniformity in the
application of that law and thereby contributing to legal and ec-
onomic cohesion from the outset of the operation of the CSME.
On the other hand, the CCJ will also sit at the apex of the
judiciary of those Member States that have chosen to adhere to
its Appellate Jurisdiction in substitution for the Judicial Commit-
tee of Her Majesty's Privy Council in England. The tribunal in
this instance will be applying the Constitution, statutes and the
common law' of the country from which it hears matters as the
court of final instance. The Commonwealth Caribbean Member
States of the Community have decided on this step in order to
complete the cycle of independence by patriating the highest
judicial function. This unique legal craftsmanship is all the
more surprising given the political ethos of the Member States of
the Community, particularly as regards sovereignty. There is the
recognition, however, that for small States wishing to make their
way in an often misanthropic world order, insistence on abstract,
if not absolute, sovereignty often leads to the negation of that
2. Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community includ-
ing the CARICOM Single Market and Economy, July 5, 2001, available at http://www.
caricom.org/infoserv.htm [hereinafter Revised Treaty].
3. The civil law Member States will not accede to the Court in its Appellate Juris-
diction for the time being.
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very sovereignty. In the words of the Basic Propositions put for-
ward by the Expert Group of Heads of Government in their re-
port, Regional Integration: Carrying the Process Forward ("Regional
Integration") :4
The basic precept that CARICOM is a Community of Sover-
eign States acknowledges the ultimate sovereignty of the
Member States of the Community. This does not, of course,
preclude them in the exercise of that sovereignty from pursu-
ing collective action to deepen and perfect the integration
process - as we have done, for example, in the case of the
Caribbean Court of Justice.
The authors then go on to make the following fundamental ob-
servation:
Indeed, we believe that the Community must explore dili-
gently, other possibilities for the collective exercise of sover-
eignty by way of a creative approach to regional governance
in cases where such an arrangement clearly advances the inte-
gration of our Community while maintaining its essential
character. The collective exercise of national sovereignty, as
in the case of the Caribbean Court of Justice, highlights our
Community's special challenge of fashioning an approach to
regional governance that is both functional and imaginative
- one that could perhaps serve as a model for others to fol-
low in the pursuit of innovative forms of integration.5
It is submitted that the latter statement is most appropriate for
many developing countries wishing to carry out regional integra-
tion schemes but wary of fundamentally compromising hard-won
independence and sovereignty.
This Article will consider the following: Part I will discuss
some general issues concerning dispute settlement internation-
ally. Part II discusses dispute settlement systems in the Regional
Economic Groupings, including the World Trade Organization
("WTO") (as evidenced in the infamous "Banana Dispute") and
the future Free Trade Area of the Americas ("FTAA"), given that
the Revised Treaty will be notified under article XXIV of the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 1994 and will presuma-
4. Sir Shridath Ramphal et al., Regional Integration: Carrying the Process Forward: Re-
port on the Establishment of a CARICOM commission or other Executive Mechanism, Draft
2.10.03 (Nov. 2003) available at http://www.caricom.org/caricomcommission.htm.
[hereinafter Regional Integration].
5. Id.
[Vol. 27:930
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bly be accepted as being consistent with the understanding
thereunder. Part III will examine the Role of the CCJ as the
judicial organ of CARICOM and the interplay between the origi-
nal and appellate jurisdictions of the CCJ. Part IV will analyze
the institutional and jurisdictional distinctiveness of the CCJ (in-
cluding its referral procedure) and the features of the CCJ that
make it sui generis. Part V addresses the role of precedent, stare
decisis, and the rule of Non liquet in the regime and their implica-
tions for the interface of common law and civil law. Part V will
also include an analysis of the attitude towards precedent at the
international level. Finally, Part VI will discuss locus standi for
natural and legal persons and, to a lesser extent, the Advisory
Opinion of the head of jurisdiction.
1. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The comprehensive work Legal Problems of International Eco-
nomic Relations sets forth several general propositions of interna-
tional law.6 While one or more of these propositions may not
represent current thinking on a particular issue, they are worth
mentioning here:
" the theoretical bases of international law;
" the sources: customary and treaty law as well as the distinc-
tion and the interplay between these sources;
" the important aspects of treaty law, particularly the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (1980);
" the relationship between international treaties and domes-
tic law, in light of constitutional requirements for incorpo-
ration or the doctrine of the transformation of interna-
tional legal obligations into the municipal sphere;
* the difficulty for common law students and practitioners to
understand that a strict rule of stare decisis does not, and
cannot operate at the international legal level, even while
precedent has played and continues to play a critical role in
the development of the international legal order 7;
* traditional international law has been deemed to provide
rules that govern relationships between governments.
6. LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 244-46 (John Jackson
et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter LEGAL PROBLEMS].
7. As will be seen, this posit has largely been overtaken and in fact has been di-
rectly challenged in the regime. The discussion infra has been assisted by the contribu-
tion from my colleague Mr. Ronald Burch-Smith, Legal Consultant, Caribbean Court of
Justice, Project Coordinating Unit.
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Thus, the basic origin of international law suggests a very
small role for individuals or private firms. Governments
enter into a treaty, or invoke a dispute settlement process.
When individuals or private firms have a grievance against a
foreign government, typically they must go to their own
government to provide diplomatic protection in the sense
of carrying their case forward to an international forum.
This can be quite confusing at times, and certain trends
have begun to break down this different legal status for gov-
ernments as compared to individuals or firms.8
The authors then go on to make the following observation:
The role of the individual under international law, both as a
legal entity obligated to obey international law norms and as
a legal entity benefited by international law norms (such as
human rights rules), has been evolving. This evolution has
been particularly rapid since World War II and it is now gen-
erally accepted that individuals do have a certain interna-
tional legal status.9
Ian Brownlie refers to this in the context of the diminution of
the reserved domain of State jurisdiction.1 ° This has been a fea-
ture of what has been termed the growth and development of
the Charter Conception. This phenomenon has challenged the
hitherto supreme rule of the Westphalian Conception. The lat-
ter obviously relates to the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), credited
with being the birth-point of the modern Nation-State. On the
other hand, the Charter Conception is linked to the United Na-
tions Charter (the "Charter"), which has spawned the exponen-
tial growth and development of International Organizations (in-
cluding those dedicated to regulating international economic in-
teraction) that rival, if not supplant the State as the prime
subject of international law.
The central purpose of the discussion is to examine the role
that law as applied judicially, may or may not play in the new
Caribbean Community. Within the context of the Charter Con-
ception therefore, it is appropriate to highlight certain of the
bases of obligation under international law. This is important,
because if obligations contracted do not fit one or more of these
categories, then it may be difficult if not impossible, for any dis-
8. LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 6.
9. Id. at 245.
10. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 291 (2003).
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pute resolution process to operate effectively. Oscar Schacter
identifies the following bases of obligations:
(i) consent of States;
(ii) customary practice;
(iii) a sense of "rightness" - the juridical conscience;
(iv) natural law or natural reason;
(v) social necessity;
(vi) the will of the international community (the "consen-
sus" of the international community);
(vii) direct (or "stigmatic") intuition;
(viii) common purposes of the participants;
(ix) effectiveness;
(x) sanctions;
(xi) "systemic" goals;
(xii) shared expectations as to authority;
(xiii) rules of recognition.l"
This list effectively incorporates legally binding precepts as well
as norms grounded more in comity than in de lege lata. In any
event, they represent the framework within the rule of pacta sunt
servanda enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which operates in inter-State interaction.
At another, wider jurisprudential level, the Charter sets out
in Chapter I its purposes and principles. Article 1 is worth quot-
ing in full given its direct bearing on our topic:
The purposes of the United Nations are:
1. to maintain international peace and security, and to that
end: to take effective collective measures for the preven-
tion and removal of threats to the peace, and for the sup-
pression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the
peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in con-
formity with the principles ofjustice and international law,
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situa-
tions which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. to develop friendly relations among nations based on re-
spect for the principles of equal rights and self-determina-
tion of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to
strengthen universal peace;
3. to achieve international co-operation in solving interna-
11. Oscar Schacter, Towards a Theory of International Obligation, from The Effec-
tiveness of International Decisions (Papers and proceedings of a conference of the
American Society of International Law)(1971), reprinted in LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note
6, at 247.
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tional problems of an economic, social, cultural, or hu-
manitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or re-
ligion; and
4. to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in
the attainment of these common ends.
12
Chapter VI, entitled "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," sets forth
in article 33 an explicit statement of the duty to resolve disputes
peacefully:
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely
to endanger the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, en-
quiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,
resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peace-
ful means of their own choice. 13
These and other principles and rules within the Charter have
attained the status of peremptory norms of customary interna-
tional law and are concomitantly binding erga omnes. That is
they are binding without regard to volition or consent of the sub-
jects of international law. Thus, even in a context outside of ob-
ligations under Caribbean Community Law, the States are under
a duty to settle disputes among themselves in accordance with
the foregoing. Finally, there are certain related principles re-
ferred to as "Corollary Principles." These are identified in the
Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between
States, the so-called Blue Book, as follows:
" principle of non-use of force in international relations;
" principle of non-intervention in the internal or external af-
fairs of States;
" principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
* principle of sovereign equality of States;
" principles of international law concerning the sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity of States;
" good faith in international relations;
" principles of justice and international law.14
In particular contexts, there is also the principle concerning the
12. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1-4.
13. Id. art. 33, 1.
14. HANDBOOK ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES, U.N. Sales
No. E.02.IJI.B.1 at 4-7 (1992).
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exhaustion of local remedies whenever applicable and, finally, at
the procedural level there is the principle of the free choice of
means.
II. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AT THE HORIZONTAL LEVEL OF
REGIONAL ECONOMIC GROUPINGS
Dispute settlement at the general level of the international
legal order has to be distinguished from settlement within dis-
crete regimes such as Regional Economic Groupings. This cate-
gory of subjects of international law owes their currently elevated
status to the success of the European Communities (now the Eu-
ropean Union or "EU"). It is now widely accepted that regional
trade and economic regimes facilitate the economic growth and
development of the members and, additionally, can foster
growth in world trade. However, these arrangements must have
discrete dispute settlement rules, procedures and institutional
mechanisms. At the overarching level, the dispute settlement re-
gime is concerned with the interpretation and application of the
constituent instrument(s) and decisions or actions emanating
therefrom. More narrowly, the system will concern itself with:
* complaints against Member States for non-compliance with
the agreed rules, which may be brought by other member
States, community institutions, or, as will be seen, by natu-
ral or legal persons with locus standi, where the constituent
instruments accord such status;15
* complaints against the institutions of community, in actions
brought by Member States, other institutions or natural or
legal persons where they are given this right;16 and
" the interface between domestic tribunals and Community
tribunals including the duty of the former to refer matters
to the regional tribunal or other institutions for the inter-
pretation or determination of specific facets of Community
law.17
It is necessary to place regional integration organizations within
the wider ambit of entities that are subjects of international law
and that, in consequence, dispose of certain rights and are sub-
ject to certain obligations, including international responsibility.
15. See MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 121-23 (Phillip Sands et
al. eds., 1992).
16. See id.
17. See id.
2004]
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In that regard, while the Congress of Vienna in the latter part of
the nineteenth century witnessed the birth of international orga-
nizations, 18 it is nonetheless fair to say that the Conferences at
Yalta and Bretton Woods, which led to the foundations of the
United Nations System, provided the greatest stimuli to the
growth of those entities which today challenge the sovereign
State for primacy in the international legal order.
In fact, one of the Bretton Woods institutions, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice ("ICJ"), would ensure that the organiza-
tion could not be disregarded, ignored or treated with disrespect
as a prime subject of the law. In the Reparations for Injuries Case, 9
the Court had to deal with the capacity of the United Nations to
espouse international claims. The judgment stated among other
things that:
The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily
identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights, and
their nature depends upon the needs of the community.
Throughout its history, the development of international law
has been influenced by the requirements of international life,
and the progressive increase in the collective activities of
States has already given rise to instances of actions upon the
international plane by certain entities which are not States
This development culminated in the establishment in June
1945 of an international organization whose purposes and
principles are specified in the Charter of the United Nations.
But to achieve these ends the attribution of international per-
sonality is indispensable. 20
The Court then went on to enumerate some of the faculties and
describe the competence of the UN, including its enjoyment of
certain privileges and immunities which create rights and duties
between each of the Parties to the Charter and the UN. 2' From
that perspective, "[i]t is difficult to see how such a convention
could operate except upon the international plane and between
parties possessing international personality. ''22
18. One such organization is the International Postal Union. Prior to the United
Nations there were organizations such as the League of Nations and its judicial body,
the Permanent Court of International Justice ("PCIJ").
19. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1949 I.CJ. 174 (Apr. 11).
20. Id. at 178-79.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 179-80.
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This prime example of the purposive, teleological interpre-
tation of the constituent instrument of the UN led the ICJ to
adumbrate the following view:
The Organization was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is
in fact exercising and enjoying, functions and rights which
can only be explained on the basis of the possession of a large
measure of international personality and the capacity to oper-
ate upon an international plane. . . . It must be acknowl-
edged that its Members, by entrusting certain functions to it,
with the attendant duties and responsibilities, have clothed it
with the competence required to enable those functions to be
effectively discharged.23
That naturally would lead to a conclusion that the UN is an in-
ternational person. However, obeisance still had to be paid to
State sensibilities:
That is not the same thing as saying that it is a State, which it
certainly is not, or that its legal personality and rights and
duties are the same as those of a State. Still less is it the same
thing as saying that it is a super-State, whatever that expres-
sion may mean. It does not even imply that all its rights and
duties must be upon the international plane, any more than
all the rights and duties of a State must be upon that plane.
What it does mean is that it is a subject of international law
capable of possessing international rights and duties, and that
it has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international
claims.2 4
While the numerous caveats are clearly intended to and still
today do placate those with an essentially retrogressive view of
sovereignty, the fact is that the UN is created to carry out certain
tasks, disposes of certain rights and is susceptible to being im-
pleaded under certain circumstances. This is as true for the UN,
the EU, as well as the Caribbean Community. The way in which
this ruling has become axiomatic in dealing between States and
the UN may be seen as analogous to the fact that while prece-
dent may not formally exist in international law except where
specifically created by a treaty, there still remains the inestimable
value of generally accepted or consensual practice - jurispru-
dence constant - often crystallized. Not even the most extreme
23. Id.
24. Id.
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opponent of international organizations would contest that the
facets attributed to the UN have passed into customary interna-
tional law. The practice of the United States is evidenced in The
Restatement of International Law: even when the United States
withdrew from the UN Educational, Social and Cultural Organi-
zation ("UNESCO"), it accepted that at customary international
law a duty exists to grant the organization certain privileges and
immunities.
The Member States of CARICOM therefore must accept
that by their actions, they have created an entity, which, in Ian
Brownlie's, words is "a permanent association of States, with law-
ful objects, equipped with organs."25 Furthermore, there exists
"a distinction, in terms of legal powers and purposes, between
the organization and its Member States. ' 26 Finally, just as critical
to the legal personality of an international organization is "the
existence of legal powers exercisable on the international plane
and not solely within the national systems of one or more
States.
27
The criteria for legal personality in the CARICOM regime
are fully met. The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas sets out in
article 12, paragraph (3) the Functions and Powers of the Con-
ference; the Supreme Organ in the following terms: "Save as
otherwise provided in this Treaty, the Conference shall be the
final authority for the conclusion of treaties on behalf of the
Community and for entering into relationships between the
Community and international organizations and States. ' 2' This
function clearly requires international legal personality. The dis-
tinction between the powers of the members and those of the
organization is evidenced in article 80 on the Co-ordination of
External Trade Policy. It stipulates, inter alia, that:
1. Member States shall co-ordinate their trade policies with
third States or groups of third States.
2. The Community shall pursue the negotiation of external
trade and economic agreements on a joint basis in accor-
dance with principles and mechanisms established by the
Conference.
25. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 649.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Revised Treaty, supra note 2, art. 12, 3.
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This is to be contrasted with paragraph 3, dealing with the bilat-
eral interactions of the Member States, which provides that:
3. Bilateral agreements to be negotiated by Member States in
pursuance of their strategic national interests shall:
a. be without prejudice to their obligations under this
Treaty; and
b. prior to their conclusion, be subject to authentication
by the CARICOM Secretariat that the agreement does
not prejudice or place at a disadvantage the position of
other CARICOM States vis-A-vis the Treaty.
The requirement of the fourth paragraph is even more strin-
gent:
4. Where trade agreements involving tariff concessions are
being negotiated, the prior approval of the Council for
Trade and Economic Development shall be required.29
A. Dispute Settlement in International Economic Law: Comments on
the World Trade Organization ("14TO") and
the Emerging FTAA
All commentators agree that the results of the Uruguay
Round of multilateral trade negotiations, codified in the Mar-
rakesh Agreements Establishing the WTO have brought a signifi-
cant measure of coherence to the legal and institutional frame-
work of international economic law. The Dispute Settlement
System ("DSS") within the regime has been improved beyond
recognition:
[T]he Uruguay Round has entered into history as a unique
achievement, indeed a transitio ad alterum genus, in compar-
ison to all the preceding 'rounds.' This applies also to dis-
pute settlement, which moved from its hitherto marginal po-
sition to become, as is said in Article 3.2 of the Understand-
ing, a 'central element' in the new trading system.30
The former President of the European Court of Justice,
Pierre Pescatore, considers the following to be the "strong
points" of the new multilateral regime:
(1) the system has been in many respects brought up to a
29. Id. art. 80.
30. Pierre Pescatore, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, in REGIONALISM
AND MULTILATERALISM AFrER THE URUGUAY ROUND 661 (Paul Demaret et al. eds., 1997).
2004]
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higher level of legal effectiveness; (2) the, so far, essentially
normative provisions of the various agreements have been
embedded into an institutional structure; (3) the unity of the
system of dispute settlement, which had been breaking apart
after the Tokyo Round, has been restored; (4) a bridge has
been opened from sectorial isolationism of "GATT law" to
general international law; (5) the system of sanctions has
been recognized in a multilateral framework; (6) finally, we
may note that all those procedural devices which had proved
to be essential for the effective functioning of the old GATT
mechanism have been taken over integrally into the new sys-
tem.
3 1
This "impressive record" has "radically cured" the prevailing un-
certainty by virtue of the fact that:
the WTO Agreements have been negotiated in the form of
regular international treaties, entered into in conformity with
the constitutional provisions of the members. By this, the
provisions relating to dispute settlement benefited from a
double upgrade: not only have they been embodied in a formal
Understanding, but the same Understanding, in virtue of arti-
cle 11:2 of the WTO Agreement, has received the same legal
authority as the constitutive instrument itself, of which it
makes an integral part.
32
The result of the termination of this "legal vagrancy '3' has been
to create in the WTO a DSS with a "three-tier logic comprising:
(a) nullification and impairment of trade benefits; (b) frustra-
tion of the organization's objectives; (c) disregard of obligations
flowing from the organization's constitutive instrument and
from the rules governing dispute settlement."3 4 While the old
system did relate to general international law, all agreed that the
relationship has been made "more explicit, not only through the
mode of setting up the organization, but also by "the express
recognition, in article 3:2 of the Understanding, that dispute set-
tlement serves to clarify the existing provisions of the various
agreements 'in accordance with customary rules of interpreta-
tion of public international law." '' 35
31. Id. at 662.
32. Id. (emphasis in original).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 666.
35. Id.
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It is a very short step to conclude that this refers "essentially"
to the rules of interpretation as codified in the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties. The instrument has formed parts of
the ruling of panels, and as discussed above, Pescatore identifies
the following provisions of the Convention relevant to regulating
the law in this area:
" international treaties are binding and must be imple-
mented and interpreted in good faith (Articles 26 and 31);
* internal legislation is no excuse for failure to implement a
treaty obligation (Article 27);
* treaty provisions are, in principle, non-retroactive (Article
28);
" treaty obligations coincide normally with the sphere of ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of States (Article 29);
" treaties must be interpreted in good faith, in accordance
with the ordinary meaning of their terms, in context and in
light of their objects and purpose (Articles 31-32);
* linguistic difficulties, in case of multilingual treaties, are to
[sic] resolved also by the object-and-purpose test (Article
32).36
While being hortatory, two paragraphs of the Convention
are deemed to be of importance when dealing with this facet of
the international legal order. These are paragraphs 3, relating
to the principle of good faith and the "universally" recognized
rule of pacta sunt servanda, and paragraph 8, which stipulates
that: "the rules of customary international law will continue to
govern questions not regulated by the provisions of the present
Convention. '3 7
B. Elements of the General and Institutional Provisions: Including
the Dispute Settlement Chapter of the Second Draft of the
FTAA Agreement (the "Second Draft",3
Having cursorily examined the multilateral dimension of
the issue, it is now useful to consider some of the FTAA provi-
sions which either directly or indirectly impact upon the Revised
36. Id. at 667.
37. Id.
38. See FTAA - Free Trade Area of the Americas, Second Draft Agreement, Nov.
1, 2002, FTAA.TNC/w/133/Rev.2 (not yet entered into force), available at http://www.
ftaa-alca.org/ftaadraft02/draft-e.asp [hereinafter Second Draft].
2004] 943
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Treaty of Chaguaramas, as will be notified under article XXIV of
the GATT 1994 and the Understanding thereunder.
The FTAA will bring together thirty-four of some of the ter-
ritorially and economically largest and smallest countries in the
world. It will group resource-endowed and resource-challenged
societies. In all of this, one must bear in mind that the neo-
theological dictates of globalization and liberalization are often
quite unmindful of size or capacities in its seemingly inexorable
"thrust" forward (mass protests notwithstanding).
At the same time, this attempt to create a new regional eco-
nomic integration regime will bring together States which are
themselves part of [sub]-regional integration movements -
Mercosur, CARICOM, the Andean Community and the Central
American Common Market. A significant legal and jurispruden-
tial challenge, therefore, exists to secure the competence of
these entities even while creating a coherent hemispheric re-
gime. It would be appropriate, as well, to be mindful of the po-
litical and economic strategy propelling this initiative.
A major issue in the Negotiating Group on Dispute Settle-
ment in the early stages of the process was the issue of the legal
and juridical relationship between the FTAA and existing re-
gional economic integration movements. The issue was ulti-
mately settled by the Trade Ministers, along with other institu-
tional questions that were deemed to be "cross-cutting issues."
The majority of countries would not be persuaded that the new
entity would be legally superior to and form the juridical apex of
their international economic interaction. The fact that the
more appropriate view prevailed is evidenced in the Preamble. 9
The text is replete with square brackets, but for present pur-
poses, only those contained within the provisions to be cited will
be reproduced. The legal and juridical relationship issue is dealt
with in two paragraphs. The Preamble speaks of the prospective
parties, "[c]onsidering their respective rights and obligations
under the World Trade Organization agreements and other
multilateral, regional and subregional instruments of integration
and co-operation."40 In the second reference, the parties speak
of "removing to the extent possible, consistent with article XXIV
39. Id. at Preamble to the FTAA Agreement.
40. Id.
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of the GATT 1994, other restrictive regulations of commerce. '"41
The latter paragraph is of obvious importance to the ex-
isting regional economic groupings. Having notified under the
cited provision, and having "passed muster" at the Working
Group level,4 2 they are allowed certain external flexibilities as
long as, on the whole, the measures adopted do not appear to be
more trade restrictive than those existing prior to the grouping
being formed.
The Preamble, following the recent practice described
above by Pescatore but achieved over the objections of certain
major players, also makes clear that the participating countries
are "[c] onvinced of the importance of creating effective proce-
dures for the interpretation and application of this agreement, for
its joint administration and for the resolution of disputes among
the Parties."4
Articles 3 and 4 of the General Articles of the Second Draft,
dealing with, respectively, Principles and the Application and
Scope of the agreement, track the relationship issue in the fol-
lowing terms:
a. consistency of the rights and obligations emanating from
this Agreement with the rules and disciplines of the World
Trade Organization;4 4 and
b. the co-existence of this Agreement with bilateral and sub-
regional agreements, to the extent that the rights and obli-
gations deriving from these agreements are greater in
scope than those hereunder. 45
In terms of the Scope of Application, paragraph 3 of article 4
declares that the new agreement shall "co-exist with bilateral and
sub-regional agreements . -46 Furthermore, the new agree-
ment "does not adversely affect the rights and obligations that
one or more Parties may have under such agreements, to the
extent that such rights and obligations imply a greater degree of
integration than provided for hereunder."47
By virtue of the next paragraph, the negotiating partners
41. Id.
42. See id. at Draft Chapter on Dispute Settlement, art. 10, 155.
43. Id. at Preamble to the FTAA Agreement (emphasis added).
44. Id. at General Articles of the FTAA Agreement, art. 3c.
45. Id. art. 3d.
46. Id. art. 4, 1 4.3.
47. Id.
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"confirm the rights and obligations in force among them under
the WTO Agreement."48 Still, there is an important caveat: "In
the event of conflict between the provisions of the WTO Agree-
ment and the provisions of this Agreement, the provisions of this
Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict."4 9
This rule is going to provide the basis for major litigation, as
the partners in the North American Free Trade Area ("NAFTA")
seek to write higher levels of, and/or new, rules and disciplines
in relation to such areas as Investment Policy,5° Competition Pol-
icy,51 Intellectual Property Rights, 52 Government Procurement,5 3
and, in terms of institutional and dispute settlement matters, the
participation of non-State entities in the procedures of the or-
ganization. 5
4
The Draft Text on General and Institutional issues also con-
tains a notification requirement where members enter into in-
ternational agreement in cases where the latter "refer to matters
covered in" the FTAA Agreement. 5 Finally, there is an interest-
ing Review and Appeal procedure, which requires the establish-
ment or maintenance of judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative
entities to review and correct "measures of general application"
which presumably impact on the agreement.56 The second sen-
tence of this provision has a link with the case law of the ECJ in
terms of the Preliminary Ruling Procedure discussed later in this
Article. 57 The provision states that the tribunals entrusted with
the review or appeal "[shall be impartial and independent of the
office or authority entrusted with [administrative enforcement
[of the law]] [to apply measures of general application respect-
ing any matter covered by this Agreement], and shall not have
any substantial interest in the outcome of the matter].5
48. Id. art. 4, 4.4.
49. Id.
50. See generally id. at Draft Chapter on Investment.
51. See generally id. at Draft Chapter on Competition Policy.
52. See generally id. at Draft Intellectual Property Rights Chapter.
53. See generally id. at Draft Chapter on Government Procurement.
54. See generally id. at Draft Chapter on Dispute Settlement.
55. Id. at Draft Text on General and Institutional Issues, art. 8.3.
56. Id. art. 11.1.
57. See infra notes 164-165 and accompanying text; see generally Dorsch Consult In-
genieurgesellschaft v. Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin, Case C-54/96 [1997] E.C.R. 1-4961.
58. Second Draft, supra note 38, at Draft Text on General and Institutional Issues,
General Articles of the FTAA Agreement, art. 11.1.
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Of even greater significance, at least judicially, is that the
CCJ, in interpreting and applying the constituent instrument of
the Caribbean Community, may be invited to and may even on
its own volition take judicial notice of the newer regime. How-
ever, it would be entirely within its right to regard the latter as res
inter alios actos, or to opt to go in the direction of the European
Court in the ERTA and subsequent line of cases." A Caribbean
Court faithful to its tasks will ensure that the Member States, in
carrying out the obligations of the FTAA, do not infringe the
rules in article 80 of the Revised Treaty. Article 45 of the Dis-
pute Settlement Chapter of the FTAA provides a measure of flex-
ibility. The provision contains rules dealing with the interpreta-
tion of the latter agreement in judicial or administrative pro-
ceedings of a party.6" Given the fundamental posit of this article,
consistent with the Revised Treaty and the Agreement Establish-
ing the CCJ, the context requires that the proceeding addressed
in article 45 of the Dispute Settlement Chapter of the FTAA and
its reference to a municipal tribunal must be read to mean the
regional court.
Article 43 of the Dispute Settlement Chapter of the FTAA
gives the party in whose territory the judicial or administrative
proceedings are being held the duty to notify the FTAA Secreta-
riat if it "considers ... [that the issue of interpretation or appli-
cation] ... merits its intervention, or if a judicial ... body solicits
the views of one of the Parties . . . [to the FfAA]."6 While the
procedure adopted is that the Executive Body for Dispute Settle-
ment will strive to find a non-binding position to put forward,
the more important point is that the judicial body has the au-
thority to regard the position as a factual statement, not a state-
ment of the law. The Member States of the Community, the Of-
fice of General Counsel, and the Legal Affairs Committee will
therefore have to be vigilant to ensure that no matter comes
before the regional judicial body in which a FTAA issue is being
raised, directly or indirectly, and to ensure that they do not in-
tervene, if only not to cause embarrassment to particular Mem-
ber States. Similar vigilance will be needed in situations where
Member States of the Community purport to implement FTAA-
59. See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
60. See Second Draft, supra note 38, at Draft Chapter on Dispute Settlement, art.
45.
61. Id. art. 43, 222.
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consistent, but WTO-inconsistent, measures and where these
have a negative, or at least a detrimental, impact on the Single
Market and Economy sufficient enough to cause proceedings to
be instituted in the CCJ.
Apart from the foregoing, there are some other issues
within the dispute settlement regime of the proposed FTAA that
the negotiators for the Caribbean Community and other re-
gional groupings may wish to study carefully. They include:
1. The Article 4 assertion of the Dispute Settlement Chapter
that the intent of the dispute resolution system is to ensure
the application of agreed principles and to maintain "a
balance between rights and obligations of the Parties ,,;62
and the assertion that the DSS is there to "preserve the
rights and obligations of the Parties... and to clarify the
existing provisions... in accordance with customary rules
of interpretation of public international law."6 3 Will the
major players in the new regime agree that the Right to
Development has passed from de legeferenda to lex lata and
into customary international law? Even now the norm of
State sovereignty over natural resources is being chal-
lenged as a rule of customary law.
2. Then, there is the issue of choice of forum, set out in Arti-
cle 6 of the Dispute Settlement Chapter. The Members of
CARICOM must ensure that the adopted text incorporates
the right of its Members inter se to settle disputes among
themselves on matters which impact upon the Revised
Treaty, as the FTAA is bound to do within their own fo-
rum.
3. In terms of Multiple Complaints, the Chapter on Dispute
Settlement, as presently structured, limits the right of
Member States to initiate judicial proceedings at any time,
if they choose not to be enjoined as a Complaining Party
under the FTAA procedures. Again, the CARICOM nego-
tiators - and those from whom they receive their instruc-
tions - need to re-examine this provision closely.
It may be apposite to remind all concerned that the legal and
juridical distance between the matters regulated under the
WTO, the FTAA, and the Revised Treaty are merely words away.
62. Id. art. 4, 1 24.
63. Id. art. 4, 1 2.
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C. The Jurisprudential Bases for the Revised
Dispute Settlement Regime
A fundamental question that arises in constructing and evalu-
ating dispute settlement systems at the international level is
whether the systems should be primarily designed to adjudi-
cate disputes or to mediate them. If mediation is the goal,
then a dispute settlement system must emphasize methods
designed to encourage the contending parties to negotiate a
solution to their dispute. If adjudication is the goal, then a
system must be able to apply the relevant rules consistently
and ensure that the decisions produced by the system are im-
plemented. 64
The commentary and analysis in the Reports of the Inter-
Governmental Tasks Force, which elaborated the Revised Treaty,
would show that the Caribbean regional integration movement
does not believe that the solution must be either mediation or
adjudication. The experience of the past thirty years has shown,
through the dismal failure of the former to weld together a
tightly-knit process, that optimal utilization of adjudication can
only assist the process. Therefore, a key element of the policy
can be couched in the following terms:
In the interest of the development, economic and social pro-
gress of the Member States of CARICOM and their nationals,
this tier of dispute settlement has to be put in place. The
Gentleman's agreement mode has been tried and tested and
found severely wanting. The system now desperately needs
an injection of the rule-based approach to which CARICOM
is subjected, in any event, at the multilateral level and to
which it is to be subjected, imminently, at the hemispheric
level.65
John Jackson posits a list of "policies that underlie the way
that institutions and procedures have been shaped within the
United States"" in terms of the application of dispute settlement
64. LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 6, at 327-28.
65. Sheldon McDonald, Signposts to the Development of Judicial Institutions in
the Caribbean Community - The Advisory Opinion Jurisdiction and the Referral Pro-
cedure of the Agreement Establishing the CCJ (2000) (unpublished article) (on file
with author).
66. John Jackson, Perspectives on the Jurisprudence of International Trade: Costs and
Benefits of Legal Procedures in the United States, 82 MicH. L. REv. 1570, 1574 (1984), re-
printed in LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 6, at 1211.
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involving international economic and trade interactions. Al-
though written as an apologia for American unilateralism in the
global trading system, the procedures, standing on their own,
represent the kind of ideals to which the entire Single Market
and Economy aspires, and within that regime, the dispute settle-
ment system. The policies are as follows:
(1) The procedure should maximize the opportunity of gov-
ernment officials to receive all relevant information, ar-
guments, and perspectives. Thus, a procedure that al-
lows all interested parties to present evidence and argu-
ments would enhance the realization of this goal.
(2) The procedure should prevent corruption and ethical
mala fides, even when the latter fall short of corruption
and illegal activity. Another way to express this is that an
important policy goal of the procedure is to prevent
"back room political deals" that favor special or particu-
lar interests while defeating broader policy objectives of
the... (Community).
(3) The procedure should enhance the perception of all par-
ties who will be affected by a decision that they have had
their chance to present information and arguments, i.e.,
that they have had their "day in court. .. "
(4) The procedure should be perceived by the citizens at
large as fair and tending to maximize the chances for a
correct decision. A sense of fairness will include a desire
that even weaker interests ... be treated fairly. ...
(5) The procedure should be reasonably efficient, that is, it
should allow reasonably quick government decisions and
minimize the cost both to government and to private par-
ties of arriving at those decisions ....
(6) The procedure should tend to maximize the likelihood
that a decision will be made on a general . . . interna-
tional basis, not catering particularly to special interests.
In other words, the procedure should be designed so that
government officials can realistically be assisted in "fend-
ing off" special interests that conflict with the general
good of the . .. (Community].
(7) The procedure must fit into the overall constitutional sys-
tem[s] of the societ[ies] concerned and be consistent
with the policy goals underpinning [those] constitutional
system [s].
(8) Predictability and stability of decisions are important val-
ues. Predictability of decisions, whether based on prece-
THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
dent, statutory formulas, or something else, enables pri-
vate parties and their counselors (lawyers, economists,
and politicians) to calculate generally the potential or
lack of potential for a favorable decision under each of a
variety of different regulatory systems .... "
To the extent that the framers of the Treaty of Chaguaramas and
the State Parties thereto have agreed to establish a structure of
unlimited duration with discrete powers, rights and duties, they
have decided to set up a legal order separate and distinct from
the existing sovereignties. They have volitionally ceded aspects
of existing sovereignty in a discrete number of areas. Even prior
to the elaboration of the Revised Treaty, what they had not
done, however, is follow through and define the full external
contours of the new legal order, nor had they decided on certain
critical internal facets incorporating elements of the rule-based
approach set out above.6" This realization has finally dawned on
the leadership of the Community.
The premier regional integration arrangement, the EU, had
to face problems relating to "legal vagrancy" on the part of the
Member States, even while it was instituted as a supranational
entity. The EU, at that time the European Communities, had in
place from the outset institutions that would ensure that there
would be no faltering. The European Court of Justice stated in
Costa v. E.N.E.L.:
By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC
Treaty has created its own legal system which, on the entry
into force of the treaty, became an integral part of the legal
systems of the Member States and which their courts are
bound to apply. By creating a Community of unlimited dura-
tion, having ... powers stemming from a limitation of sover-
eignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the Commu-
nity, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights
and have thus created a body of law which binds both their
nationals and themselves.
69
Supranationality has not been a feature of the Caribbean
67. LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 6, at 1211-12.
68. Cf supra note 24.
69. Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., Case 6/64, [1964] ECR 585, [1964] 1 C.M.L.R. 425.
It should be noted that although the Member States have limited their own sovereign
rights, they have done so within stipulated fields. The process has now reached the
stage of political union.
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Community but there are treaty rules that have purported to
bind CARICOM nationals. A prime example of this is article
84(3) of the Revised Treaty, formerly article 14(6) of the Annex
to the original Treaty of Chaguaramas, 70 which deals, in the con-
text of Community Rules of Origin, with situations where there
is an interruption with supply or an inadequacy of raw materials
and the manufacturer wishes to obtain extra-regional supplies.
There is a requirement that "he [the manufacturer] shall so in-
form the competent authority" of his country,7 ' who then takes
the steps necessary to have the Secretary-General act. 72 This is a
perfect legal duty which, in a strict jurisprudential sense, re-
quires nothing more to give it legal effect. Sovereign States have
always negotiated and will always negotiate treaties with provi-
sions that have self-executing effect, legal positivists notwith-
standing. The current leadership of the Community has now ac-
cepted that the growth and development of the Community and
the very survival of their countries require the volitional cession
of elements of sovereignty to the regional "pool." This becomes
even more necessary as powerful extra-regional forces increas-
ingly attempt to erode that sovereignty.7"
Along with the foregoing change of attitude, there is a need
for the Community to recognize that for the movement to pro-
gress, rules of public international law and international trade
and economic law must occupy pride of place in their interac-
tion.7 ' To the extent that the thrust toward the Single Market
and Economy incorporates the creation of executive, judicial,
and administrative structures, implications not yet properly un-
derstood by some are involved. The changes will pose chal-
lenges. Rather than be frightened by these changes, policy mak-
ers and technocrats alike should invest intellectual capital and so
create a situation allowing for the new institutions to make rules
70. See Revised Treaty, supra note 2, art. 84(3).
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. Significant sections of this Article draw on previously published and unpub-
lished works by the present Author. See generally Sheldon A. McDonald, Signposts to the
Development ofJudicial Institutions in the Caribbean Community: The Referral Procedure of the
Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court ofJustice, in CARICOM Secretariat, 2001 ISSUES
AND PERSPECTIVES 25-41 [hereinafter Signposts]; CARICOM and the New Millennium: Dis-
pute Settlement Put Right (2000) (unpublished article) (on file with author).
74. This need has been recognized by the Expert Group of Heads of Government
and the Legal Affairs Committee.
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and take decisions which will give flesh to the "skeletal" Body of
Community Law, which has hitherto existed but has been
malnourished for thirty years.
That "Body of Community Law" will require certain sup-
porting sources to which we now turn. The following list incor-
porates eligible "candidates" around which the law will develop
based upon sources of Caribbean Community law:
75
" the Treaty of Chaguaramas, its Annex, and its Protocols;
" rules and principles of General International Law;
* rules and principles of International Trade and Economic
Law, particularly as evidenced in the GATT, the WTO, and
where applicable, the practice of other Regional Economic
Groupings;
" international Treaties validly concluded by the Community;
* opinions of the Legal Affairs Committee;
* instruments, Regulations, and Procedures validly adopted
by Community Organs, Subsidiary Bodies and Institutions;
* decisions of the Organs, Subsidiary Bodies, and Institutions
of the Community going back as far as the Caribbean Free
Trade Area ("CARIFTA");
* state practice (of Members), particularly as evidenced in bi-
lateral trade and economic agreements between themselves
and with third States or groups of third States;
" general constitutional and legal principles and fundamen-
tal rights upon which the municipal legal orders of the
Member States are built;
* determinations by the Caribbean Court ofJustice and other
dispute resolution bodies charged with making final deter-
mination of issues, for example, the Competition Commis-
sion and Arbitration Panels;
* legislative, regulatory, and administrative decisions of Mem-
ber States that have legal effect, but also fall within the
sphere of operation of the Treaty; and
* judicial decisions of municipal tribunals impacting on pro-
visions in the Treaty but not purporting to declare on the
validity thereof, or on decisions of Organizations, Subsidi-
ary Bodies, and Institutions of the Community.
These sources, together with an enforcement mechanism,
are necessary to:
75. The list includes elements which may not be formally deemed "sources." How-
ever, to the extent that they will serve to buttress the formal sources, they will be useful
to the tribunal.
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1. protect the organization, its agents and persons entitled
through them;
2. give effect to non-political interpretation and application
of the Treaty and other Community decisions;
3. make legal determinations concerning breaches of the
outputs of the decision-making structures;
4. examine the vires of acts of the Community Institutions;
5. the settlement of all germane disputes;
6. establish the legal parameters of the relationship between
the Community (and its Institutions) and Member States,
as well as the relationship between both of these and natu-
ral and legal persons (Community nationals); and
7. generally, control the acts of the organization and the le-
gal limits to its power vis-A-vis the sovereignty of its mem-
bers.7 6
In resolving disputes within the Community, all of the mecha-
nisms involved, whether it be the Conference, the COTED, Arbi-
tration Panels, Conciliation Commissions, the Competition
Commission, or the Caribbean Court of Justice, will have to bear
in mind two critical factors. The first is the primacy of Commu-
nity Law, and the second turns on the interface between that law
and the General Constitutional and legal principles and Funda-
mental Rights upon which the municipal legal orders of the
Member States are built. This is natural given the fact that
outside of flagrant breaches of treaty or other obligations, many
disputes will turn on the manner in which, or the procedures by
which, Members States give effect to their obligations. This will
operate at three levels of interaction:
i. Member States inter se;
ii. Member States - Community Organs and Bodies; and
iii. Member States - natural and legal persons.
At the level of disputes between Community Organs and
Bodies and disputes between these entities and natural and legal
persons, the issues may be no less complex but they are suscepti-
ble to the application of the more generalized sources of law.
However, it remains arguable that wherever and whenever dis-
putes involving natural and legal persons arise, internal legal
and constitutional principles and issues of fundamental rights
are always raised appropriately. An analysis of how these matters
76. See BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 680-89.
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were treated at an earlier stage of the development of the Euro-
pean Community may be of value to present efforts. Tie Euro-
pean Court of Justice's judgments in several cases are perhaps
the easiest way to tackle that analysis.
The Court has always taken the view that fundamental rights
constitute an integral part of the general principles which it is
bound to uphold.77 The juridical basis for the adoption of these
principles derives from the long-standing practice of interna-
tional tribunals to draw upon, as a source of law, general princi-
ples. It was not supposed that the new legal order of the Euro-
pean Communities wished to exclude this inherent interpreta-
tional tool. The Treaty of Rome implies the contrary, since
article 164 asserts that the Court shall, in interpreting the Treaty,
ensure that "the law is observed." 8 In addition, article 173 men-
tions "any rule of law" as a ground for invalidating acts of the
Community.79 Furthermore, article 215, dealing with the non-
contractual liability of the Community, sets up as a criterion the
determination of such liability in accordance with "the general
principles common to the laws of Member States."8 It is con-
cluded that given the essentially similar evolution of the legal
orders in the Western European State System, a clear presump-
tion therefore obtains that the general principles of municipal
law is a source of Community Law.
D. The Principles Elaborated
1. Proportionality
In the words of the ECJ, this principle means that "the indi-
vidual should not have his freedom of action limited beyond the
degree necessary for the public interest."81 Thus, a provision of
a regulation requiring forfeiture of a security for any failure to
perform a contract, irrespective of the gravity of the breach, was
struck down.82 The tribunal held that the penalty must be "com-
77. See Nold v. Commission, Case 4/73, [1974] E.C.R. 491, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 338.
78. See Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11 art. 164 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
79. Id. art. 173.
80. Id. art. 215.
81. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle ffir Ge-
treide und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, 1127.
82. See Atalanta Amsterdam BV v. Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees, Case 240/78,
[1979] E.C.R. 2137.
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mensurate" with the degree of failure to implement the obliga-
tions. Similarly, acts of Member States designed to implement
treaty provisions, or secondary legislation, can also be struck
down. This was particularly the case with derogation on provi-
sions dealing with quantitative restrictions or their equivalent,
article 36. The ECJ has made it clear on a number of occasions
that under any one of the heads, the measure must be propor-
tionate to the mischief being sought to be corrected and also
that where other measures can achieve the same results, deroga-
tion will not be allowed. The same approach was adopted in re-
spect of article 48(3) derogation concerning the free movement
of workers. Thus in Rutili83 and Bouchereau,8 4 the Court insisted
that the fundamental rule in article 48 can only be avoided
where there is a "genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the
requirements of public policy." 5
2. Legal Certainty and Legitimate Expectations
This principle requires that subjects of the legal system
should not be placed in a position where they are uncertain as to
their rights or their obligations. In Gondrand Freres,8 6 it was de-
cided that ambiguity or lack of clarity of measures imposing
charges was to be decided in favor of the taxpayer. On the other
hand, it has also been held that the principle applied in favor of
Member States where the latter had incurred expenditure in le-
gitimate anticipation of financial aid from the Community. This
has implications in the implementation of Chapter Seven of the
Revised Treaty, particularly article 158 establishing The Develop-
ment Fund.8 7 This principle also operates to preclude legislative
and administrative measures taking effect without publication.
Note should be taken, however, of the judgment in Decker, where
the court held that a measure can have retroactive application in
the exceptional circumstances if the objective to be achieved so
requires and the legitimate expectations of the parties con-
83. Rutili v. Ministre de l'interieur, Case 36/75, [1975] E.C.R. 1219.
84. Regina v. Bouchereau, Case 30/77, [1977] E.C.R. 1999, 2014, [1977] 2
C.M.L.R. 800, 825.
85. Id.
86. Administration des douanes v. Soci&6 anonyme Gondrand Freres, Case 169/
80, [1981] E.C.R. 1931.
87. See Federal Republic of Germany and Bundesanstalt ffir Arbeit v. Commission
of the European Communities, Case 44/81, [1982) E.C.R. 1885.
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cerned are observed.88 However, upon the special pleading of
several countries, the Court in Defrenne v. Sabena slightly reversed
itself, holding that article 119 of the Treaty relating to non-dis-
crimination had direct effect and could not be applied retroac-
tively.89 The case was one in which any other result could have
led to catastrophic consequences for the economies of some
Member States.
3. Equality
This principle obviously requires that differential treatment
in comparable situations be based on objective factors. This has
been held to be one of the fundamental principles of the Com-
munity's Civil Service Establishment. The equality principle also
has implications for gender and other forms of discrimination
and provisions impacting on treatment of workers discussed else-
where in this Article.
4. Fundamental Rights
In the first place, the European Court of Justice has made
reference to the European Convention on Human Rights.9 ° In
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, the tribunal rejected the conten-
tion that a Community act could be impugned for inconsistency
with even the most fundamental tenet of national constitutional
law.91 However, the Court also held that:
An examination should be made as to whether or not any
analogous guarantee inherent in Community law has been
disregarded. In fact, respect for fundamental rights forms an
integral part of the general principles of law protected by the
Court of Justice. The protection of such rights, whilst in-
spired by the constitutional traditions common to the Mem-
ber States, must be ensured within the framework of the
structure and objectives of the Community.92
Thus, while Stauder confirmed the existence of these rights,
88. See Weingut Gustav Decker KG v. Hauptzollamt Landau, Case 99/78, [1979]
E.C.R. 101.
89. See Defrenne v. Sabena Airlines, Case 43/75, [1976] 1 E.C.R. 455, 2 C.M.L.R.
98 (1976).
90. See, e.g., Stauder v. City of Ulm - Sozialamt, Case 29/69, [1969] E.C.R. 419,
[1970] C.M.L.R. 112 (1970).
91. See Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH, [1970] E.C.R. at 1127.
92. Id.
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the latter judgment identified their primary source as the munic-
ipal constitutional system. The ECJ, like the European Court of
Human Rights, tends towards what the latter has termed an "au-
tonomous concept." Although the source may be national law,
generalized application - in the Community context - re-
quires that the judicial authority ensure uniformity.
The Court has also spoken approvingly of other principles
of law such as due process and the right to a proper defense and
in a major decision, upheld the confidentiality of communica-
tion between lawyer and client.9 3
5. The Supremacy of Community Law
The English scholar, Lawrence Collins, makes an interesting
summary of the bases of the supremacy of Community Law de-
rived from the case law of the ECJ. His nine-point summary is as
follows:
1. Community law confers rights on individuals which na-
tional courts are bound to enforce and protect.
2. Municipal legislation cannot prevail over Community law,
no matter which came first in time.
3. The efficacy of Community law cannot vary from one
Member State to another.
4. Member States cannot take or maintain in force, measures
that are liable to impair the useful effect of the Treaty.
5. Member States cannot give authoritative rulings [by legis-
lation or otherwise] on the interpretation of Community
Regulations.
6. Community law cannot be tested in municipal courts for
compliance with the constitutions of Member States.
7. Member States cannot remove from ordinary courts, the
power to apply Community law.
8. Where the Court declares the legislation of a Member
State to be incompatible with Community law, the compe-
tent authorities of the State are under a duty to amend or
repeal the offending act and its courts are under a duty to
ensure the ECJ's judgment is complied with.94
9. Member States cannot excuse their non-performance of
Treaty obligations by reliance on their domestic constitu-
93. See AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission of the European Communities, Case
155/79, [1982] E.C.R. 1575.
94. The process has reached the stage where financial penalties now attach to
Member States for infringement of sections of the treaties.
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tions.95
III. THE CCJ AS THE JUDICIAL ORGAN OF THE COMMUNITY
Perhaps without appreciating the juridical and legal signifi-
cance of their actions, the Conference of Heads of Government
of the Caribbean Community made the then Caribbean Court of
Appeal, which was to be established by the Organization as the
final instance tribunal for all of the Member States, the judicial
organ of the Community. This is the effect of the decision taken
at the meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government in
1988.
In 1970, the Organization of Commonwealth Caribbean Bar
Association had recommended a Caribbean Court of Appeal. A
Consultative Committee established under its auspices con-
firmed that support and proposed an original jurisdiction for
the said court in treaty matters falling under the Dickensen Bay
Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Free Trade Area. Also in
1970, the Conference of Heads of Government of the Common-
wealth Caribbean (the precursor to the Caribbean Community),
adopted a resolution calling for the establishment of such a
court.
The Conference paused in the drive to establish the judicial
tribunal until the establishment in 1989 of the West Indian Com-
mission, which was designed to comprehensively review the inte-
gration movement and propose measures to ensure its growth
and development in the then-changing international political,
economic and legal orders. In 1992, that body would recom-
mend that the Community establish a Caribbean Supreme Court
with both appellate and original jurisdiction. The new judicial
tribunal would be considered as an "autonomous body" of the
Community - its judicial organ. Those persons who are timor-
ous about describing the CCJ as the judicial organ of the Com-
munity only apparently are rescued by the fact that the two new-
est Members, Suriname and Haiti are not common law jurisdic-
tions. The rescue, however, is more apparent than real. As will
95. LAWRENCE COLLINS, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 11-12
(1984). Collins appears at times to be nostalgic, anticipating the lost of the supposed
English "distinctiveness" and yet unreconciled that the U.K would be in Europe "for-
ever." Id.
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be seen, the legal and political schema around the Court con-
firms its roles as the judicial organ.
The appellate jurisdiction of the Court notwithstanding, the
institution will play a pivotal role in re-shaping the socio-eco-
nomic landscape of the Members of the Community as a result
of the judgments, opinions and orders it will make in the con-
text of the Single Market and Economy. The common law sys-
tems will benefit from the flow-over effect of decisions made in
the treaty context involving disputes in which the civil law coun-
tries are litigants, given the binding effect of the judgments.
Similarly, the civil law systems of the Community will not escape
that flow of the regional common law jurisprudence of the ap-
pellate court into the municipal domain, particularly in such ar-
eas as human rights. In fact, the Chief Justice of the Eastern
Caribbean Supreme Court,9 6 His Lordship, Sir Denis Byron, is
already on the record predicting that the CCJ will be the biggest
single contributor to the harmonization of the practice and ap-
plication of law in the Member States of the Community.
Furthermore, the Project Coordinating Unit for the Estab-
lishment of the CCJ has sponsored a process of engagement be-
tween the legal academic community of the University of the
West Indies and the University systems of Haiti and Suriname on
the requirements of legal education in the new dispensation.
The Legal Affairs Committee has also received proposals from
the Council of Legal Education on these matters. These steps
form a logical part of the process of the fashioning of an indige-
nous jurisprudence. The need for a sea change in the legal and
jurisprudential approaches to integration has been finally ac-
cepted at the highest level of the Community.
The Rose Hall Declaration emanating from the Twenty-
Fourth Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government,
adopted on the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Community, July 4,
2003, in Montego Bay, Jamaica, recognizes the need to change
direction.9 7 It tackles the issue of supranationality by disclaiming
any pretense at achieving it, given not only the fact that CAR-
96. The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court includes the national High Courts of
nine Eastern Caribbean States and a single Court of Appeal for the States, thereby giv-
ing those States harmony in judicial interpretation.
97. The Rose Hall Declaration on "Regional Governance and Integrated Develop-
ment" Adopted on the Occasion of the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Caribbean Commu-
nity (CARICOM) at the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Govern-
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ICOM is a "Community of Sovereign States" but also the expedi-
ence of the movement towards regional integration proceeding
in that "political and juridical context.""8 However, that said, the
instrument speaks of the:
Development of a system of mature regionalism in which crit-
ical policy decisions of the Community taken by Heads of
Government, or by other Organs of the Community, will have
the force of law throughout the Region as a result of the op-
eration of domestic legislation and the Revised Treaty of
Chaguaramas appropriately revised, and the authority of the
Caribbean Court of Justice in its Original Jurisdiction - taking
into account the constitutional provisions of the Member
States.99
CARICOM will be doing no more or no less than the "parent" of
the constitutional law and practice of the majority of its Member
States, the United Kingdom, which was constrained upon acces-
sion to the European Communities to enact legislation giving
domestic legal effect to Community Law with all its supranation-
ality.100
In arriving at this position in 2003, the Conference was
merely reminding itself (indirectly) of its earlier decision made
in 1999. This decision directed the Secretariat to consider mea-
sures of ensuring the effective integration of Suriname and Haiti
- with their civil law systems - into the Community, particu-
larly as regards the effective participation of both of these coun-
tries in the CCJ."' That decision was arrived at after the Confer-
ence underscored the "centrality of the Caribbean Court of Jus-
tice in the institutional structures of the Community, including
its importance to the successful functioning of the CARICOM
Single Market and Economy. "102
ment of CARICOM, July 2-5, 2003, available at http://www.caricom.org/archives/rose
halldeclaration.htm.
98. Id. art. A, 1.
99. Id. art. A, 2 (emphasis added).
100. See the discussion on the United Kingdom's European Communities Act,
1972, infra note 150 and accompanying text.
101. See Communiqu6 of the Seventh Special Meeting of the Conference of Heads
of Government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Chaguaramas, Trinidad
and Tobago, October 26-27, 1999, available at http://www.caricom.org/archives/com
muniques-hgc/7sphgc-1999-communique.htm. This was also the meeting that decided
to set up the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of the Caribbean Court of
Justice. See id.
102. Id.
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Although it is very clear that the CCJ has to be the judicial
organ of the Community, the issue has nonetheless been actively
debated at the technical level. Indeed, there had to be a bifurca-
tion, with respect to the Revised Treaty and the Agreement Es-
tablishing the Caribbean Court of Justice (the "CCJ Agree-
ment"),103 precisely because of the sui generis nature of the
Court.
All the rights and obligations under the Revised Treaty fall
upon "Member States of the Community." These are set out in
article 3V14 In the definitional article 1, the firstjuridical separa-
tion of the institutions directly constituted under and regulated
by the Revised Treaty and other bodies occurs.1"5 "Agreement"
is defined as "the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court
of Justice," and concomitantly, "Court" is so defined." 6 The
Court, while receiving its juridical empowerment under the con-
stituent instrument of the Community, will be established under
and regulated by a separate international instrument. A similar
situation arises with the CARICOM Regional Organization for
Standards and Quality ("CROSQ"), which is provided for by arti-
cle 67(5) of the Revised Treaty, but came into being by way of an
Inter-Governmental Agreement. On the other hand, the Organs
of the Community, the Competition Commission and other enti-
ties with important functions including actions on the interna-
tional legal plane are all directly regulated under the Revised
Treaty.
Contrary to an argument which would place them as being
completely distinct from the treaty-created and regulated enti-
ties, it is closer to reality that given the tasks entrusted to the CCJ
and CROSQ, as well the political context in which they are being
established, the Member States accepted the advice that they be
given distinct juridical personality and legal capacities. In terms
of the CCJ, the need for this separation is also related to the
issue of membership. Article 3(2) of the Revised Treaty allows
103. Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, Feb. 14, 2000, availa-
ble at http://www.caricom.org/archives/agreement-ccj.htm (entered into force on July
23, 2003 upon the deposit of the Instrument of ratification by Guyana) [hereinafter
CCJ Agreement]. Earlier, Saint Lucia had ratified the Agreement at the Twenty-Third
Meeting of the Conference in early July 2003 and shortly thereafter Barbados followed
suit. The Agreement entered into force pursuant to article XXV.
104. See Revised Treaty, supra note 2, art. 3.
105. See id. art. 1.
106. Id.
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membership into the Community of "any other State or Terri-
tory of the Caribbean Region that is, in the opinion of the Con-
ference, able and willing to exercise the rights and assume the
obligations of Membership."' 0' However, in the case of the
Court, membership is more restricted. Given its sui generis na-
ture, a State or Territory may be "able and willing to exercise the
rights and assume the obligations of membership," but they still
have another threshold to cross. In the words of article II of the
CCJ Agreement, membership to the Court is open to any mem-
ber of the Community as well as "[a] ny other Caribbean country,
which is invited by the Conference to become a Party to this
Agreement."108
The Conference may, in its wisdom, invite a Caribbean
country to become a member of the Court, even if that country
has no interest in becoming a member of the Community. This
is not as incongruous as it may appear. A country with which the
Community has extensive bilateral trade and economic interac-
tion could conceivably think it appropriate to become a part of
the CCJ Agreement and thus avail itself of an authoritative and
determinative dispute settlement regime without taking on all
the obligations of membership in the Community. Conversely, a
Commonwealth Caribbean country or Territory may not be able
to exercise the rights and assume the obligations of membership
of the Community but may find it convenient or may be allowed
to participate in the appellate jurisdiction of the Court.'0 9 The
invitation to join would thus be appropriate in both circum-
stances.
However, while all of the Member States "agree that they
recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agree-
ment, the original jurisdiction of the court referred to in Article
211,"110 it will be only those Member States Contracting Parties
to the Agreement that will have locus standi. Article 211 states:
1. Subject to this Treaty, the Court shall have compulsory
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes
107. Id. art. 3(2).
108. CCJ Agreement, supra note 103, art. II.
109. The CCJ Agreement carries its own discrete set of rights and obligations, for
example, those relating to the financing of the entity and enforcement of the judg-
ments, orders, etc. of the Court. See id. art. XXVI-II.
110. Revised Treaty, supra note 2, art. 211.
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concerning the interpretation and application of the
Treaty, including:
a. disputes between the Member States parties to this
Agreement;
b. disputes between Member States parties to the Agree-
ment and the Community;
c. referrals from national courts of the Member States par-
ties to the Agreement;
d. application by persons in accordance with Article 222,
concerning the interpretation and application of this
Treaty.
Concomitantly, in the CCJ Agreement, it is stipulated that the
various heads of jurisdiction set out above can only be accessed
by or utilized against Contracting Parties to the Agreement."'
Furthermore, in respect to appellate jurisdiction, which is not
addressed in the Revised Treaty but in the CCJ Agreement, it is
stipulated that "the Court is a superior Court of Record with
such jurisdiction and powers as are conferred on it by this Agree-
ment or by the Constitution or any other law of a Contracting
Party."1 12
The juridical distinction drawn between membership in the
Community and participation in the Court regime does in fact
permeate the latter. The fact is that the initial function of the
tribunal in the appellate role within a State system, where the
common law is the dominant tradition, has been augmented by
an international dispute settlement competence. There are two
Member States that have distinct legal systems and that will not
use the appellate jurisdiction of the Court. Even some of the
Commonwealth Caribbean Members of the Community (even
initially) may opt not to adhere to that municipal jurisdiction.
This is a quintessential sovereign function. Further proof of the
separation is to be seen in the fact that the right of audience
before the Court is limited to practitioners duly admitted to
practice law in the courts of Contracting Parties to the CCJ
Agreement,' 1 3 so that legal practitioners from the Member
States not Parties to the CCJ Agreement are excluded, unless
and until they are admitted to the bar of a Party.
The Revised Treaty is the over-riding instrument constitut-
111. CCJ Agreement, supra note 103, art. XII.
112. Id. art. XXV, 1.
113. Id. art. XXIX.
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ing the Community. The Single Market and Economy is integral
thereto. The CCJ is crucial for the functioning of the latter, and
so all Member States have to contract into the CCJ - in its origi-
nal jurisdiction - as the judicial organ of the Community. This
objective is secured by way of Chapter 9 and specifically articles
211 to 222. This binding power erga omnes is reinforced by the
fact that by article 221 decisions of the Court will constitute stare
decisis.'' 4 This is yet another innovation in the regime to which
we will return. Article 221 provides: 'Judgments of the Court
shall constitute legally binding precedents for parties before the
Court unless such judgments have been revised in accordance
with Article 219. '' 115 As will be seen, when this provision and the
non liquet rule is discussed, the fashioning of the law in the new
order will inescapably have an impact across its two jurisdictions
and two legal systems, particularly if one accepts that issues of
social and economic rights cannot be seen as being distinct in
countries such as Haiti and Jamaica.
Hence, while the CCJ Agreement contains the substantive
provisions of the appellate jurisdiction, for the purpose of dis-
cussing the CCJ as the judicial organ of the Community, that
instrument, at this time, is really more in the nature of a statute.
If the time ever arrives where all the members of CARICOM de-
termine that they wish to have another tier in their judicial hier-
archy and accord that role to the CCJ, then it will become the
complete judicial organ as envisaged by the West Indian Com-
mission and the OCCBA's Consultative Committee. Due to sen-
sitivity over the issue of sovereignty, this kind of approach is
often not candidly analyzed.
Another reason for this "discussion-deficit" has to do with
insulating the Court from the perception or possibility of any
kind of external interference, particularly political interference.
In fact, the CCJ Agreement is completely inviolate in that regard.
From the present perspective, the correct approach is not to dis-
claim the central role of the tribunal, but rather to take reinforc-
ing measures if these are required. We will look at the practice
elsewhere.
Other integration regimes have established regional courts
and have explicitly named them as the judicial organ. The pre-
114. See Revised Treaty, supra note 2, art. 221.
115. Id.
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miere integration schema, the European Community, organized
it in the following way in the Treaty of Rome:
The tasks entrusted to the Community shall be carried out by
the following institutions:
European Parliament,
Council,
Commission,
Court of Justice,
Court of Auditors.
Each institution shall act within the limits of the powers con-
ferred upon it by this Treaty.' 16
There is no scope for the Parliament, the Council or the Com-
mission to issue instructions to the Court, as such actions would
be ultra vires of the "limits of the powers conferred on them."
The Conference of Heads of Government is the Supreme Organ
of the Community, pursuant to article 12 of the Revised Treaty,
and has the authority to determine the policy directions of the
Community.1 17 However, given the fact that the rule of law and
the doctrine of the separation of powers are living features
within the constitutional orders of all the members of the Com-
munity, it would be improper to infer that the above compe-
tence would be used by the Conference to influence the CCJ.
On the other hand, no matter how practically distant, the theo-
retically legal possibility does exist for such interference. But
that lacuna can be closed. The European Community precedent
set out above is largely followed in respect to regional Courts of
the following: the European Free Trade Area; The Andean
Community; the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Af-
rica ("COMESA"); and the Economic Community of West Afri-
can States ("ECOWAS"). While the constituent instrument of
the first three makes no attempt to specifically insulate the judi-
cial tribunal, the ECOWAS Revised Treaty does: article 6 sets
out the institution of the Community, and paragraph 2 therein
requires each to "perform their functions and act within the lim-
its of the powers conferred on them by this Treaty and the Proto-
cols relating thereto."1 ' However, the architects of the regime
did not believe that the judicial institution was sufficiently insu-
116. EEC Treaty, supra note 78, art. 4.1.
117. See Revised Treaty, supra note 2, art. 12, 2.
118. Economic Community of West African States: Revised Treaty, July 24, 1993,
art. 6, 35 I.L.M. 660, 668 [hereinafter ECOWAS].
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lated. In consequence, one finds in article 15 of the ECOWAS
Treaty, on the Establishment and Functions of the Court, the
following stipulation in paragraph 3: "The Court of Justice shall
carry out the functions assigned to it independently of the Mem-
ber States and the Institutions of the Community."11 9 This provi-
sion provides one way in which the lacuna in the CARICOM re-
gime can be closed.
The Revised Treaty provides fertile ground for the CCJ to
develop the indigenous body of Community law that is so often
spoken about. Clearly with respect to trade in goods and ser-
vices generally, the free movement of capital, competition pol-
icy, inter-institutional disputes, disputes between Member States
and the Organs and Institutions and disputes between regional
organizations established by Inter-Governmental Agreements
and the Community qua Community counsel will plead and the
bench will have recourse to the sources of law discussed above.
In respect to competition policy, the Revised Treaty provides a
discrete regime in Chapter 8, which involves a regional quasi-
judicial Competition Commission and national authorities. It is
obvious, however, that issues, particularly at the municipal level,
will reach the Court either by way of the referral procedure or at
the behest of natural and legal persons seeking to have their
rights vindicated pursuant to article 222.
On the other hand, there are three specific situations where
the Court is empowered directly in this matter. First, with re-
spect to Determination of Anti-Competitive Business Conduct
regulated by article 175, the Commission is authorized to investi-
gate claims and, where appropriate, issue instructions for correc-
tive action. Paragraph 11 brings in the judicial body to give
teeth to that instruction: "If the enterprise cannot comply with
the time period specified [in the instruction] and fails to inform
the Commission, the Commission may apply to the Court for an
order."'12 The enterprise affected may take the view that the
Commission is acting unjustly. In that situation, a party "which is
aggrieved by a determination of the Commission under para-
graph 4 of Article 174 in any matter may apply to the Court for a
review of that determination."12
119. Id. art. 15, 3.
120. Revised Treaty, supra note 2, art. 175, 11.
121. Id. art. 175, 12.
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There are also situations where the Commission, proprio
motu, decides to investigate anti-competitive business conduct. 122
The Council for Trade and Economic Development ("COTED")
is given the authority to settle issues of differences between the
Commission and the Member State. However, even in this situa-
tion, the exclusive and compulsory jurisdiction of the Court is
retained: "Nothing in this Article shall prejudice the right of the
Member State to initiate proceedings before the Court at any
time.
123
There is a cluster of issues that, although dealt with in the
Revised Treaty, require action thereon either by the Community,
Member States, or a combination of both. Disputes here will
turn on whether these entities have or have not carried out their
duties. Some of these issues include Intellectual Property Rights
and the Management and Utilization of Natural Resources, in-
cluding maritime resources. Invariably, the regime will have to
establish some sort of human rights regime as well, and the
Court will sit automatically at its apex.
There is one matter that must be addressed early and the
Revised Treaty as well as the CCJ Agreement may need to be
amended by way of a protocol to address this matter: Public Ser-
vants in the Member States have recourse to municipal courts
for judicial review of administrative actions in relation to their
conditions of service. International public servants in the pay of
the UN have recourse to its Administrative Tribunal. However,
servants of the Caribbean Community do not have this right and
they are precluded from taking their case to municipal courts.
The regime must at some time - preferably sooner rather than
later - be adjusted to incorporate, within the jurisdiction of the
CCJ, the same empowerment that is given to the ECJ by the
Treaty of Rome: "The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction in
any disputes between the Community and its servants within the
limits and under the conditions laid down in the Staff Regula-
tions or the Conditions of employment."124
Another possible expansion of the jurisdiction of the Court,
which again could be adapted from the EU, is the empowerment
to accept specially agreed requests from Member States to settle
122. See generally id. art. 176.
123. Id. art. 176, 6.
124. See EEC Treaty, supra note 78, art. 236.
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disputes that relate to matters contained in the Revised Treaty,
but that are of a strictly bilateral nature and fall within matters
reserved for the Member States themselves. Issues which come
to mind include maritime delimitation and the utilization of nat-
ural resources. These issues are addressed with the Industrial
Policy Chapter, and they are related to international obligations
the Member States have under international law, particularly the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the
Agreement on Highly Migratory and Straddling Fish Stocks.
There have been frequent disputes between Member States over
both issues. The Treaty of Rome, in article 82, provides as fol-
lows: "The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction in any dispute
between Member States which relates to the subject matter of
this Treaty if the dispute is submitted to it under a special agree-
ment between the parties." 125
The disputes that have arisen and are amenable to being
settled in this way have often threatened to rupture relations be-
tween Members of the Community, and bilateral negotiations
have often proven incapable to breaking the impasse. It is sub-
mitted that the Member States concerned would have confi-
dence in their judicial tribunal to find the means of resolving
these issues.
An emerging energy issue that is likely to engage the CCJ
very early on involves the issue of national treatment and non-
discrimination in respect of access to and pricing of natural re-
sources as these relate to energy within the context of the CSME.
There is a disagreement between two Member States regarding
access to and pricing of liquid natural gas ("LNG"), or the natu-
ral gas that goes into making liquid natural gas, that is being
purchased by a Member State from another Member State that
produces natural gas. As the General Counsel of the CARICOM
Secretariat has expressed it:
A regional energy policy is widely regarded as critical but the
interests of Member States do not necessarily converge. For
energy exporting countries, expansion in natural gas output
(and high export prices) is anticipated to have positive im-
pacts of seismic proportions in relation to such key macro-
economic variables as GDP, Balance of Payments, govern-
ment revenue and expenditure, and industrial competitive-
125. Id. art. 239.
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ness. For energy importing countries, access to regional natu-
ral gas is welcomed as reducing dependency on imported oil
by diversification of energy consumption, protecting the
economy from the destabilizing impact of oil price volatility
and, generally, enhancing the competitiveness of the protec-
tive sector. Industrial competitiveness is among the most im-
mediate concern. Energy is a significant cost component in
the manufacturing process. Access by the productive sector
in one Member State to natural gas at lower net back prices
than is available to the productive sector in other Member
States, has been claimed to have had a devastating impact
upon the manufacturing industry and balance of payment
profile in many of the first State's traditional trading partners
within the Community.
1 2 6
V. THE JURJSDICTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
DISTINCTIVENESS OF THE CARBBEAN
COURT OF JUSTICE
The features that make the Caribbean Court of Justice dis-
tinctive are:
* the unique nature of its jurisdiction;
* the non liquet rule;
* the role of the doctrine of stare decisis and precedent in the
original jurisdiction;
" locus standi for natural and legal persons;
" the referral procedure;
" the advisory opinion procedure;
* the modality utilized for appointing the Judges;
" the modality utilized for the appointment of the President;
" sources from which the Judges may be drawn;
" mode of financing the Court;
" the peripatetic nature of the Court; and
* compliance with Judgments and Orders.
In terms of the jurisdictional distinctiveness, significant elements
of this have been discussed above. The Revised Treaty empow-
126. Advisory Opinion on National Treatment and Non-discrimination in respect
of access to, and pricing of natural resources as these relate to energy in the context of
the CSME, CARICOM Secretariat, October 2003 [hereinafter Advisory Opinion]; see
also David Renwick, Pricing LNG Within CARICOM, TRINIDAD GUARDIAN, Nov. 30, 2003,
available at http://petroleumworld.com/storyTT194.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2004) (re-
porting on the Jamaican position on the Advisory Opinion as it relates to natural gas
pricing by Trinidad and Tobago).
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ers the institution in terms of its original jurisdiction. Articles
211-222 are repeated, with the consequential changes in the CCJ
Agreement. However, to demonstrate that both jurisdictions of
equal importance to the Community and to the Member States
concerned, article III of the latter establishes the Court with:
(a) Original jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of
Part II, and
(b) Appellate jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of
Part 111.127
In the case of both jurisdictions, "[t] he decisions of the Court
shall be final. 1
28
While in the common law context, stare decisis and prece-
dent are the norm, it is acknowledged that international tribu-
nals are given to the notion of jurisprudence constant, although
the European Court of Justice has often gone further and
adopted an approach closer to the common law regime. What
makes the CCJ distinctive is that the doctrines have been im-
ported over into the international facet of its jurisdiction. This
will mean from the outset that all Member States, Community
Organs and Bodies, as well as natural and legal persons operat-
ing with the CSME, will be bound by all its judgments, orders,
etc., and will have to think twice about ignoring Advisory Opin-
ions. The Community does not have the luxury of time for the
precepts of the supremacy and uniformity of Community law to
take effect. The Community is a capital-importing region and,
therefore, the need exists to create a socio-economic environ-
ment where external investors, as well as those within the Com-
munity, can have legitimate expectations as to the outcome of
investment decisions.
V. NON LIQUET AND STARE DECISIS
In its original jurisdiction, the law to be applied by the Court
is set out in both instruments as "such rules of international law
as may be applicable.' 1 29 Within that broad rubric, it is sug-
gested that the sources of law discussed above would form the
flesh for this skeletal provision. It is noted as well that the Court
would necessarily have to ascertain the domestic legal rules in-
127. CCJ Agreement, supra note 103, art. III, 1.
128. Id. art. III, 2.
129. Id. art. XVII; Revised Treaty, supra note 2, art. 217;
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volved in particular situations. As in Conflict of Laws, it could be
said that they would be treated as facts. However, a wider view
would affirm that the Court ought to examine the last two
sources set out as well as the general constitutional and legal
principles of the domestic jurisdictions involved, in order to
fashion a more appropriate and progressive view of the state of
international law in the particular context in which it operates.
This would have the added value of strengthening the uniform-
ity of Caribbean Community law and thus engendering greater
legal certainty.
Under both the Revised Treaty and the CCJ Agreement, the
Court is prohibited from refusing to determine a matter on the
grounds of silence or obscurity of the law: "The Court may not
bring in a non liquet on the ground of silence or obscurity of the
law.""3 EarlJowett notes that in the civil law systems, instead of
deciding a case, the judges could, if the facts did not point to a
definite conclusion, write "NL" and leave the matter for determi-
nation sometime in the future." 1 The presence of both com-
mon law and civil law systems in the legal order of the Commu-
nity requires a more definitive position on this matter. In conse-
quence, the provision barring non liquet from being applied was
deemed to be in order. Although international law, particularly
trade and economic law, has developed rapidly, there are still
lacunae.
Notwithstanding such positive expectations regarding the
interface between the two systems of law there remain concerns
about the dilution of the civil law norms by the perceived over-
whelming common law tradition of the Community. The Com-
munity's civil law countries may be only two in number, but the
fact remains that there are nine million civil law citizens in a
Community of fourteen million. These nine million civil law citi-
zens will bring with them not only different legal systems but also
new culture, new history, new national political considerations
and new economic realities and history. This may well raise simi-
lar unnecessary alarms among the common law peoples. But the
Heads of Government have resolved - by the act of welcoming
Suriname and Haiti to the Community - to overcome the non-
130. CCJ Agreement, supra note 103, art. XVII, 2; Revised Treaty, supra note 2,
art. 217, 2.
131. EARLJowErTr, THE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW 1233 (1959).
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legal differences and concerns and to extract the positive bene-
fits rather than be intimidated by the less attractive matters. It
falls within the domain of the CCJ and the members of the legal
fraternity who turn up to argue the matters that engage the
Court to ensure that the legal diversity is not an impediment to
economic (and social) cohesion but rather - and rightly so - a
boon to the integration process.
At this prefatory stage, it can be safely predicted that the
Court in its appellate jurisdiction will provide harmonization in
judicial interpretation across the Member States. This is indeed
most desirable for the integration process especially in the
sphere of human rights1 32 and commercial transactions. In the
latter sphere, it may be instructive to note that the Common-
wealth Caribbean Member States have already implemented har-
monized Companies legislation. However, in its original juris-
diction, the civil law anxiety of being overwhelmed by common
law thinking is more pronounced. In a recent presentation by
H.R. Lim A. Po, 3 ' the author prefaced his concerns from a civil
law perspective in the following words:
The principle of non-liquet and the doctrine of stare decisis are
attributes of supra-nationality. [Another writer] has elabo-
rated extensively on these attributes and has concluded that,
in exercising original jurisdiction, these attributes appear to
be open to considerably less ambiguity and speculation than
in the exercise of the Court's appellate jurisdiction.
My submission is that in the application of the principle of
non-liquet and stare decisis in the jurisdiction of the Caribbean
Court, differences in the legal systems of the Member States
become relevant.
There is a risk of bias in the Court for common law reasoning
when filling gaps in international treaty and customary law
132. This already exists among the Member States who retain the Privy Council. A
recent decision of that Court extended the constitutional interpretation mechanism
first implemented in the Eastern Caribbean and Belize, which held that the statutory
mandatory death sentence for murder conflicted with enshrined constitutional rights.
See Spence v. The Queen (not yet reported) April 2, 2001 (appeals taken from Saint
Vincent and Saint Lucia) (Criminal Appeals Nos. 20 of 1998 and 14 of 1997); see also
Reyes v. The Queen, 2 App. Cas. 235 (P.C. 2002) (appeal taken from Belize).
133. H.R. Lim A. Po, "Bridging the Divide:" The interface between the Civil Law
system and the Common Law system, with special emphasis on the role of the CCJ,
Address to the Symposium on "The Caribbean Court ofJustice" in Paramaribo (Oct. 31,
2003) (hereinafter Bridging the Divide].
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and when applying the doctrine of stare decisis. Stare decisis is
not a doctrine of civil law. Nor is it a doctrine of interna-
tional law, so it would be natural for the Court to relate in its
decision making to the manner in which this doctrine is ap-
plied in common law.134
The learned jurist continues to highlight the differences be-
tween the systems in the following words:
Important differences are that lawyers from the civil law coun-
tries tend to be more conceptual, while lawyers from the com-
mon law countries are considered to be more pragmatic.
And that priority is given to doctrine over jurisprudence in
civil law; while the opposite is true in common law. Also, in
civil law the legal rule has risen to a higher level of abstrac-
tion compared to common law....
Civil law statutes do not provide definitions. On the other
hand, the common law style of drafting emphasizes precision
rather than conciseness. Common law statutes provide de-
tailed definitions, and each specific rule sets out lengthy
enumerations of specific applications or exceptions. These
differences in style can also be found in international conven-
tions....
In civil law the main tasks of courts are to decide on particu-
lar cases by applying and interpreting legal norms, while in
common law, courts not only decide on disputes but are also
supposed to provide guidance as to how similar disputes
should be settled in the future. 13 5
Finally, the author correctly observes that "the growing globaliza-
tion of the world economy, which is based on closer integration
and cooperation among states, imposes a need for legal certainty
and unification of law. This process involves further reducing
differences between various legal systems and harmonization of
the common law and civil law legal systems."186
In view of the need for clarity and predictability in the inter-
pretation of the Revised Treaty by the sole adjudicative body, the
CCJ, the framers of the treaty and the CCJ Agreement have given
the States the comfort of the doctrine of stare decisis. Is this desir-
able? In a commentary on the experience of the European
134. Id. at 1-2.
135. Id. at 2-3.
136. Id. at 4.
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Court of Justice, Anthony Arnull made the following observa-
tion:
The general position may be stated very simply: the Court of
Justice is not bound by its previous decisions but in practice it
does not often depart from them. A doctrine of binding pre-
cedent on common law lines would have been entirely inap-
propriate in what was originally a court of first and last resort,
many of whose decisions could only be changed by amending
the Treaties, a lengthy process requiring the agreement of all
Member States and ratification by each of them in accor-
dance with their respective constitutional requirements. It
was therefore imperative that the Court should have the
power to change the direction of its case law and to depart
from its previous decisions, particularly in cases of important
constitutional implications.1 37
The learned author illustrates through a series of cases that the
Court's freedom to depart from previous decisions had to be
matched by the logical expectation that a Court of law would
demonstrate consistency and reconciliation with previous deci-
sions. Whether through the influence of common law philoso-
phy or otherwise, the Court strived to do this with limited suc-
cess. The result was an untenable situation where reference was
happily made to previous decisions that explained a current view
but inconsistent decisions were ignored or overlooked. 131
Ultimately, the Court evolved to a position that Arnull de-
scribes as an "increasing sophistication ... in handling its previ-
ous case law." '39 He therefore concludes,
it also now seems to be recognized that.., departures require
an explanation of the cases affected in order to avoid an un-
acceptable degree of uncertainty about the new legal posi-
tion. Where the Court declines to reverse a previous deci-
sion, it appears to accept that a detailed explanation of its
reasoning may be equally necessary. It remains true that the
Court does not often depart from its previous decisions. The
difference is that it is now less common for the Court to ig-
nore or misrepresent inconvenient earlier authorities.14 °
137. ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE 529
(1999).
138. See id. at 529-33.
139. Id. at 533.
140. Id.
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It is clear that the Caribbean Court of Justice in its original
jurisdiction, through the interpretation and application of ap-
propriate sources of law, will be exercising a critical integration
function of fleshing out the practical rights and obligations of
parties who appear before it. The paper rights and obligations
enshrined in the Revised Treaty come alive and find true mean-
ing in their interpretation and application. As the experience in
the treatment of municipal law "ouster clauses" that sought to
preclude judicial review in municipal law brings to mind, the re-
straint of Courts by statues is often overcome, and where neces-
sary should be overcome. It is not suggested that judicial law-
making is desirable or necessary, but it may be that in the CAR-
ICOM experience, the Revised Treaty will only bring the desired
benefits to the Community if the Court's creativity is reasonably
unbridled. The prohibition of the civil law concept of non liquet
is a statutory mandate for vision and imagination.
The necessity for liberal interpretation in these circum-
stances may ultimately overwhelm the extent to which the pure
application of stare decisis obtains. As Lim A. Po puts it, "one
would expect situations to rise over time in which reversal of ear-
lier rulings would be appropriate in order to ensure that the
Treaty would be interpreted and applied as a 'living document'
that steers rather than stifles development."14' Indeed it is clear
that the CCJ may find its duty to the Community best served by
adopting a "restrictive policy in the application of the doctrine
of stare decisis."1 4
2
Additionally, the theoretical fetter on judicial creativity in
the Revised Treaty correctly retains for the Member States the
notion, however abstract, of national sovereignty and legislative
supremacy. As the Court becomes operational, however, the
manner in which it balances the philosophical opposite, but
equally important forces will be critical to the advancement of
the integration process.
One may conclude that the philosophical chasm between
an international tribunal that applies the doctrine of stare decisis
and one that does not is not as far apart as it may first appear.
The certainty that flows from consistency has been the chosen
path of the European Court of Justice. Likewise, from the other
141. Po, supra note 133, at 10.
142. Id.
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direction, creativity that qualifies the rigidity of stare decisis is a
necessity for the CCJ. It is suggested that the approach set out
above could assist in the filling of these interstices that exist in
the emerging body of Community law.
The Court also has discretion to apply rules of equity with
the agreement of the parties to a dispute. This is set out in both
the Revised Treaty and the CCJ Agreement, which provide as
follows: "[t]he provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not
prejudice the power of the Court to decide a dispute ex aqueo et
bueno if the Parties so agree."143 This power derives from the ICJ
Statute article 38(2), and as in that instrument, this competence
qualifies the duty to apply applicable rules of international law.
Ian Brownlie considers that in the case of the ICJ, "[t] he exercise
of this power, which has not yet occurred, may not be easy to
reconcile with the judicial character of the tribunal."' 4 4
While at the level of general international law, the doctrine
of stare decisis is not formally recognized, the specialized context
in which the CCJ will operate like the ECJ requires a different
approach. As such, judgments of the Court will constitute prece-
dent, pursuant to article 221, which provides: 'judgments of the
Court shall constitute legally binding precedents for parties in
proceedings before the Court unless such judgments have been
revised in accordance with Article 219. "145 This approach to the
doctrine may seem somewhat limited. First, the precedent force
of the judgment would appear to impact only upon parties in
proceedings before the Court. Thus, the legislative, executive
and judicial authorities of the Member States concerned will
have to act accordingly. Conceivably, however, a Member State
that either has not gone to Court, or has not intervened in an
action may regard itself as not bound. I would suggest that this
would be a narrow line of reasoning, manifesting a paucity of
understanding of the wider purpose in which the tribunal is op-
erating.
The judgment of the Court in relation to Community or-
gans and bodies will be translated into action by decisions.
These decisions bind all the Members of the Community. It is
143. CCJ Agreement, supra note 103, art. XVII, 3; Revised Treaty, supra note 2,
art. 217, 3.
144. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 690.
145. Revised Treaty, supra note 2, art. 221.
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likely that a municipal court will determine a case where there is
a clear precedent, as opposed to utilizing the referral process.
The latter must be seen as applicable at all times but will be of
greatest value when the municipal tribunal is unclear or in great
doubt as to how it should interpret Community Law. The fore-
going must be the case if the precept that the administration of
justice requires that like cases be decided similarly is to be up-
held. As Brown posits: "Inconsistency in judicial decisions af-
fronts even the most elementary sense of justice. In this sense
the principle of stare decisis, of abiding by previous decisions,
figures prominently in most legal systems ... 146
The rules that have been developed around the doctrine of
precedent will have to be applied creatively in the context of the
CCJ. From the appellate jurisdiction perspective, it is much eas-
ier forjudicial reticence to be the order of the day. The continu-
ing legacy of the English jurisprudential tradition requires strict
adherence to the doctrine. On the other hand, the Caribbean
Community has two Member States, Haiti and Suriname, for
which, given their civil law tradition, the doctrine of precedent is
foreign. There are also other Member States within whose juris-
prudential history the Code Civil has played a significant part. As
in the common law tradition, the predominant view within these
jurisdictions is that judicial decisions do not constitute a formal
source of law. There is no need for ajudge in those countries to
reconcile a newjudgment with earlier ones, even if inconsistency
would be avoided.
The experience of the European Court of Justice in this
matter offers no straight forward conclusions for ready applica-
tion in our context. The decisions of that tribunal are obviously
authoritative and the Court normally follows its own decisions.
In addition, as Brown notes, the judgments are:
abstract and syllogistic, rather than concrete and discursive
like the typical English... judgment .... Although they now
sometimes refer to previous decisions which they are follow-
ing, they rarely allude to any earlier decisions from which
they may be departing. Their character has a decisive impact
on the question of precedent. First, it means that the judg-
ments often start from broad propositions of law which may
146. L. NEVILLE BROWN & FRANCISJACOBS, THE COURT OFJUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 311 (1989).
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not be intended to be taken at face value, in absolute terms,
but rather to be refined by subsequent decisions .... Sec-
ond, judgments of this kind do not easily lend themselves to
the characteristic technique of distinguishing earlier judg-
ments in the way of an English lawyer.'
4 7
So while the ECJ may follow its previous decisions, as it did in
developing doctrines such as the direct effect of Community
Law, it cannot be said that the Court regards itself as being
bound by previous decisions:
Although the English lawyers may find it strange that the
Court should not expressly recognize that it is departing from
precedent let alone give no reasons for doing so, the fact that
it should have this freedom can be readily understood. A fi-
nal court can only be bound by its previous decisions if the
law established by those decisions can, in the last resort be
amended by legislation. Since the decisions of the Court of
Justice could be affected only by an amendment of the Trea-
ties, a practical impossibility, it is inevitable that it should be
flexible in its approach to precedent.14 8
The position of the Caribbean Court of Justice with respect to its
appellate jurisdiction, is that decisions there can be amended by
legislative enactments within the domestic legal order of the
contracting parties. On the other hand, it is indeed a "practical
impossibility" to anticipate amendment of the Revised Treaty to
mitigate or otherwise amend the law developed by the Court
with respect to the original jurisdiction. 4 9 As argued above, in
relation to the role of municipal law in the work of the Court,
some measure of flexibility will be required.
At another level, the decisions of the courts of the Member
States also figure in the matter of precedent. The fact that na-
tional law is binding upon the CCJ, as an appellate tribunal, does
not preclude a synergistic relationship with Community law.
Thus, national law can render assistance in the development of
precedent. Constitutional principles will assist in the fashioning
of the law, which itself will have the status of precedent. Addi-
tionally, municipal law, particularly the decisions of tribunals,
will obviously figure where questions of the compatibility of
147. Id. at 312-13.
148. Id. at 314-15.
149. Id. at 315.
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Community law with national law fall to be determined by the
Court.
While the dominant principle is that municipal law will arise
as a matter of fact for the CCJ, it has to be clearly understood
that questions of Community law will be questions of law, not
questions of fact, for the courts of Member States and the latter
must take judicial notice thereof. This fundamental issue has to
be explicitly articulated in legislation emplacing the Court, as in
the case of the United Kingdom's European Communities Act,
1972 (the "EC Act"). 15 o This means, further, that it will be prac-
tically impossible for municipal courts to avoid decisions of the
regional tribunal, even where their State is not a party to a dis-
pute. Hence, the precedent value of judgments will widen be-
yond the apparently narrow scope of the provision.
VI. LOCUS STANDI FOR NATURAL AND LEGAL PERSONS
Although recent trends in international criminal law and
humanitarian law are radically altering the role of natural per-
sons before international tribunals, it is reasonable to say that,
with respect to trade and economic interactions, it is still usual
for the State of nationality to espouse claims of aggrieved indi-
viduals. The European Community moved away from this radi-
cally when, in the Treaty of Rome, it gave natural and legal per-
sons locus standi. 151 This right has flourished from the narrowest
of beginnings where national or Community actions "directly af-
fected" or were "directly applicable" to these persons. 152 The
new regime in CARICOM could not ignore the fact that eco-
nomic integration and the Single Market and Economy were not
about abstract factors of production, but were intended to bene-
fit persons. The dispute settlement regime had to be cognizant
of these developments and so article 222 of the Revised Treaty
establishes the grounds on which these persons may approach
the Court, as parties, by way of special leave. 153
First, the Court will decide whether "in any particular case
this Treaty intended that a right or benefit be conferred by or
150. See European Communities Act, 1972, c. 68 (UK) [hereinafter EC Act].
151. See EEC Treaty, supra note 78, art. 173.
152. For a thorough discussion of the case law on this question, see ARNULL, supra
note 137, at 106-43.
153. See Revised Treaty, supra note 2, art. 222.
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under this Treaty on a Contracting Party shall enure to the bene-
fit of such persons directly." '54 The individual then has to estab-
lish that he or she has been "prejudiced in respect of the enjoy-
ment of the right or benefit." Further, the individual must estab-
lish that the Contracting Party entitled to espouse the claim has
"omitted or declined" to do so or, conversely, has "expressly
agreed that the persons concerned may espouse the claim in-
stead of the Contracting Party so entitled."155
Where this ostensibly cumulative threshold has been met
and "the Court has found that the interest of justice requires
that the persons be allowed to espouse the claim," then it will so
order. 156 It is the view of the present author that if the CCJ ap-
proaches the task of interpreting and applying the Revised
Treaty on the basis of the purposive and teleological mode of
treaty interpretation, it will seek to ascertain whether a right or
benefit did in fact exist and was prejudiced and, thereafter, it will
ask itself whether the interest of justice calls for its intervention.
These are evidentiary issues and the fact is that dilatory be-
havior on the part of the State entitled to espouse the claim may
make it even worse for the potential litigant. It will be observed
that the steps are conjunctive. The view could be posited that
this will not pose an insuperable bar to those entities gaining
access to the CCJ if the latter follows its older "peers" - interna-
tional tribunals - and approach the interpretation and applica-
tion of the Revised Treaty from the "objects and purpose" per-
spective. The importance attached to fundamental rights by the
ECJ has already been noted. This approach has already been
matched at the municipal level by the ruling of the Judicial Com-
mittee in Gairy v. Attorney-General of Grenada,'5 7 where it was held
that:
It is in no way inconsistent for an independent State, while
continuing to bear full allegiance to the Crown, to circum-
scribe the historic rights, powers and immunities pertaining
to the Crown in its governmental capacity .... Historic com-
mon law doctrines restricting the liability of the Crown or its
amenability to suit could not stand in the way of effective pro-
tection of fundamental rights guaranteed by the [State's]
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Gairy v. Attorney General of Grenada, [2002] 1 App. Cas. 178 (P.C. 2001).
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Constitution. 158
This ruling already forms precedent for those Member States of
the Community for which the Judicial Committee is the tribunal
of final instance. It is submitted that counsel making this plea
within the context of the Court's original jurisdiction may very
well find traction. Here, again, one would find a situation where
the nature of the issue being litigated creates cross-current, in
terms of affecting both legal systems in the Community.
There is obviously a very important linkage between individ-
ual access to an international tribunal and the terms in which
that tribunal expresses displeasure at a Member State's infringe-
ment of international obligation, which infringement materially
(including financially) affects natural and legal persons. The
European Court of Justice has already blazed the trail whereby
members of the EU can now be held financially liable for
breaches of the Treaty.
1 59
A. The Referral Procedure
The foregoing notwithstanding, the view is still firmly held
that the referral procedure will provide the greatest scope for
individual natural or legal persons to access that tribunal. As far
as this procedure is concerned, CARICOM has modified the ap-
proach taken by the Treaty of Rome. Under article 177, now
article 234, of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establish-
ing the European Community, the ECJ is empowered to give
preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the Treaty and the
validity of acts of the institutions.160 Discretion is given to tribu-
nals in arriving at a decision on whether an approach should be
158. Id.
159. See KLAus-DIETER BORCHARDT, THE ABC OF COMMUNITY LAw 88-93 (2000)
(discussing Brasserie du Pecheur v. Bundesrepublik Deutshcland and The Queen v.
Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd., Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-
48/93, [1996] E.C.R. 1-1029, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 889).
160. Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community,
art. 234, O.J. C 325/33, at 273-74 (2002), 37 I.L.M. 79, 126 [hereinafter Consolidated
EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related
acts, Feb. 26, 2001, O.J. C 80/1 (2001) [hereinafter Treaty of Nice] (amending Treaty
on European Union ("TEU"), Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC
Treaty"), Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC
Treaty"), and Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom
Treaty") and renumbering articles of TEU and EC Treaty).
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made to the ECJ: "[w]here . . . a question is raised before any
court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may,
if it considers it necessary to enable it to give judgment, request
the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon." '61 However, at
final instances within the Member States, the discretion is re-
moved: "Where any such question is raised in a case pending
before a court or tribunal of as Member State against which
there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tri-
bunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice."'1 62
One hopes that CARICOM will not have to go through the
contortions that the English judiciary put itself and the country
through, before a clear and precise legal duty is agreed upon.
Article 214 of the Revised Treaty provides:
Where a national court or tribunal of a Member State is
seised of an issue whose resolution involves a question con-
cerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty, the
court or tribunal concerned shall, if it considers that a deci-
sion on the question is necessary to enable it to deliver judg-
ment, refer the question to the Court for determination
before delivering judgment. 163
It is to be noted that a case involving whether a tribunal erred in
referring (or not referring) can begin at the lowest level munici-
pally and end up at the final instance (Caribbean Court of Jus-
tice - appellate jurisdiction) and then be referred by that na-
tional court or tribunal to the judicial organ of the Community
(Caribbean Court of Justice - original jurisdiction) for the
question to be answered. The international court will not deal
with the merits of the issue; that is for the municipal court.
Thus, it is quite conceivable that, for those countries that tempo-
rarily retain the JCPC as their final instance court, the latter
could send a question to the CCJ for answering if the matter
traversed from first instance all the way up. The Judicial Com-
mittee would then remit the matter to a lower level tribunal or
itself apply the answers from the regional court to the fact of the
dispute at hand. On the other hand, one is quite certain that
the Judicial Committee would decline jurisdiction were it invited
to intervene (seize itself of jurisdiction) in an issue which clearly
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Revised Treaty, supra note 2, art. 214.
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involved the interpretation and application of the Revised
Treaty. To do any less would be to invite a diplomatic firestorm
between the United Kingdom and the Caribbean Community, as
opposed to an individual Member State thereof. In fact, the
U.K. would be susceptible to State Responsibility being attached.
With that in mind, it is apposite to quickly examine some
elements of the case law around the similar procedure in the
ECJ. This has important exoteric implications in the develop-
ment of the necessary "body of Community Law."
It is necessary first to clearly and precisely establish whether
the body referring is a "court" or a "tribunal" in the judicial
sense of the terms. In Dorsch Consult,'64 the ECJ stated that the
following criteria must be taken into account in such a determi-
nation:
(a) whether the body is established by law;
(b) whether it is permanent;
(c) whether its jurisdiction is compulsory;
(d) whether its procedure is adversarial;
(e) whether it applies rules of law; and
(f) whether it is independent. 165
In the joined cases Gabalfrisa SL and Others and Agencia Es-
tatal de Aministracion Tributaria (AEAT),166 the ECJ had to deal
with the issue of whether the referring body was independent. It
concerned an economic and administrative tribunal in Spain,
the Tribunale Economico Administrativa. This entity has juris-
diction to hear and decide final complaints with respect to a
kind of internal administrative action. The Court found that "a
separation of functions was ensured by the law between, on the
one hand, the departments of tax and authority and, on the
other, the Tribunal . . . which ruled on complaints without re-
ceiving any instructions from the authority."167 Hence, the refer-
ring body "had the character of a third party in relation to the
departments which adopted the decision forming the subject
matter of the complaint and the independence necessary for
them to be regarded as courts or tribunals for the purposes of
164. Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH v. Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin
mbH, Case C-54/96, [1997] E.C.R. 1-4961, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 237.
165. Id.
166. Joined Cases C-110/98 & C-147/98, O.J. C 149/6 (2000).
167. Id.
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the Treaty ... 168
New ground was broken in 1999 in the case DeHaan Beheer v.
Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijuzen te Rotterdam,1 69 where on a
preliminary ruling, the Court declared invalid a decision of the
Commission, which had not been directly involved in the instant
case. The Court applied what was termed the "principle of pro-
cedural economy," in that the question of the legal validity of the
Community act had been raised directly in another case which
stayed pending judgment in De Haan Beheer. Similarly, of legal
importance, is the approach taken when questions are posed im-
properly. The Order of the Court in Rouhollah Nour v. Burgen
landische Gebiets Krankenkasse"7 ° deals with this extensively.
B. The Contemporary Application of the Preliminary Ruling Procedure
by the European Court of Justice'7'
Where a national court is required to apply provisions of
Community Law in a case before it, it may stay the proceedings
and ask the Court of Justice for clarification as to the validity of
the Community instrument and/or an interpretation of the in-
strument. The Court of Justice may respond in the form of a
judgment instead of an advisory opinion; this highlights the
mandatory nature of the preliminary ruling procedure, which is
not a contentious procedure but rather one stage of a case that
begins and ends in national courts. The object of the prelimi-
nary ruling is to secure a uniform interpretation of Community
Law and, with it, the unity of the legal order. Alongside this lat-
ter function, the procedure is also important to protecting indi-
vidual rights. The national courts can only assess the compatibil-
ity of national and Community law and in the event of any in-
compatibility, enforce Community law - which takes
precedence and is directly applicable - if the content and
scope of Community provisions are clearly set out. This clarity
can only be brought about by a preliminary ruling, which means
that proceedings for such a ruling offer Community citizens an
opportunity to challenge actions of their own Member State that
168. Id.
169. Case 61/98, [1999] E.C.R. 1-5003.
170. Case 361/97, [1998] E.C.R. 1-3101.
171. Passages of this section were first voiced in my Article Signposts, supra note 73.
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contravene provisions of Community law and ensure enforce-
ment of the latter before national courts.
To a certain degree, the fact that preliminary ruling pro-
ceedings serve a dual function compensates for restricting indi-
viduals from directly filing actions before the Court of Justice. It
is thus crucial for the legal protection of the individual.
In terms of the subject-matter, the ECJ rules on the inter-
pretation of instruments and examines the validity of acts of the
institutions. Provisions of national law cannot be the subject of a
preliminary ruling, yet this fact is often neglected in the ques-
tions referred to the Court. Although procedurally inadmissi-
ble, the Court of Justice does not simply refer these questions
back to the national court; instead, it reinterprets the question as
a request by the referring court for basic or essential criteria for
interpreting the Community legal provisions concerned, thus
enabling it to then give its own assessment of compatibility be-
tween national and Community law. The process by which this is
done involves extracting from the documentation submitted -
particularly the grounds for referral - those elements of Com-
munity law which need to be interpreted for the purpose of the
underlying legal dispute.
The capacity to proceed extends to "all the courts of the
Member States." This phrase should be understood within the
meaning of Community law. Moreover, it focuses not on the
name but the function and position of the judicial body within
the systems of legal protection in the Member States. On this
basis "courts" are understood to mean all independent institu-
tions that are empowered to settle disputes in a constitutional
State under due process of law. By virtue of this definition, the
constitutional courts in the Member States and dispute-settling
authorities outside the State judicial systems - but not private
arbitration tribunals - are also entitled to refer cases.
The overriding criterion in the national court's decision of
whether or not to refer will be the relevance of the point of
Community law at issue for the settlement of the dispute before
it. Naturally, this is a matter for the referring court to assess.
The parties can only request, not require, the national court to
refer a case. The ECJ considers the relevance of the point in
terms of whether the question concerned is amenable to refer-
ral; whether a genuine legal dispute is involved, whether a
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merely hypothetical issue is being raised or whether it relates to
a point of law that has already been settled. The Court exercises
great restraint in applying these criteria and declining requests.
However, the system is being reformed and greater stringency is
being urged. Of particular note is the insistence that the referral
contain sufficiently clear and detailed information on the factual
and legal background to the original proceedings. Where this is
not provided, the Court declares itself unable to give a proper
interpretation of Community law and on that basis rejects the
application for a preliminary ruling as inadmissible. The provi-
sions cited previously also demonstrate that there is a level of
obligation to refer. A national court from whose decision there
is no judicial remedy in law is obliged to refer the issue of Com-
munity law pleaded.
The concept of appeal encompasses all forms of legal re-
dress by which a court ruling may be reviewed in fact and in law
(appeal) or only in law (appeal on points of law). The concept
does not encompass ordinary legal remedies with limited and
specific effects (e.g., new proceedings, constitutional com-
plaints). Again, as will be seen, a court obliged to refer may only
avoid doing so if the question is of no material importance for
the outcome of the case before it, has already been answered by
the Court of Justice, or the interpretation of Community law is
not open to reasonable doubt.
However, the obligation to refer is unconditional where the
validity of a Community instrument is at issue. The Court's atti-
tude in this respect has always been that it alone has the power
to reject as illegal provisions of Community law. The national
court must therefore apply and comply with Community law un-
til it is declared invalid by the Court of Justice. A special ar-
rangement applies to courts in proceedings for the granting of
provisional legal protection. According to recent judgments of
the Court of Justice, national courts are empowered, subject to
certain conditions, to suspend enforcement of a national admin-
istrative act deriving from a Community regulation or to issue
interim orders in order to provisionally determine the arrange-
ments of legal relations while disregarding an existing provision
of Community law. Failure to discharge the obligation to refer
constitutes an infringement of the Treaty, possibly making the
Member State concerned liable to infringement proceedings. In
practice, the effects of such a course of action have been limited
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given that the government concerned cannot comply with any
order issued by the European Court of Justice because the inde-
pendence of its judiciary and the principle of separation of pow-
ers mean that it is unable to give instructions to national courts.
On the other hand, concomitant with the recognition of the
principle of Member States' liability to comply is the possibility
of individuals filing for damages which may have arisen from the
State's failure to meet the duly contracted obligation to refer.
This offers better prospects of success.
In terms of the effects of the preliminary ruling (issued in
the form of a court order), it is directly binding on the referring
court and all other courts hearing the same case. Even more
importantly, in practice, it also has a very high status as a prece-
dent for subsequent cases of a similar nature.
The role and value of this procedure elicits declarations
such as the following by the Commission of the European Com-
munities:
The preliminary ruling procedure is undoubtedly the key-
stone of the Community's legal order. Forty years' experi-
ence have shown that it is the most effective means of secur-
ing the uniform application of Community law throughout
the Union and that it is an exceptional factor for integration
owing to the simple, direct dialogue which it establishes with
national courts. 1 7
2
Given the current stage in the process to inaugurate and opera-
tionalize the CCJ, a pre-emptive discussion may be useful. Cer-
tain issues surrounding the judicial system of the EU have been
the focus of analysis for years and were the subject of considera-
tion by an Inter-Governmental conference. A Working Party was
established by the Commission in May 1999 and adopted its re-
port (the "WP Report") in January of 2000.173 One of the star-
tling features noted was that preliminary rulings increased from
141 in 1990 to 246 in 1998, an 87% increase. 174 If that were to
172. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ADDITIONAL COMMISSION CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE ON INSTITUTIONAL REFORM: REFORM OF THE COMMUNITY
COURTS 2000, at 3 (2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/archives/igc2000/
offdoc/cont04022000-en.pdf
173. See WORKING PARTY FOR TH-E EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT BY THE WORKING
PARTY ON THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES' COURT SYSTEM 2000 (2000) avail-
able at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/legal-service/docs/dueen.pdf [hereinafter
WP REPORT].
174. See id. at 3.
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happen in CARICOM, there could be a crisis of no mean pro-
portions. Therefore, it may be prudent to assess the findings of
the Working Party to ascertain what we may begin to think about
when similar problems arise in our own arrangements. The en-
suing discussion therefore draws heavily on those findings, re-
peating some directly, making an effort to adapt others or
plainly presenting them and offering relevant comments
thereon.
The WP Report rejected a suggestion that involved "making
courts of final instance the only courts entitled to refer ques-
tions."' 7 5 For similar reasons it rejected another proposal to ex-
clude only references from national courts of first instance.' 76
It has already been indicated that CARICOM did not opt for any
of these extremes. All first instance courts are included, while at
the same time enabling superior courts to make referrals auto-
matically incorporates final instance courts. Additionally, the
fact that "other tribunals" could make referrals means that some
first instance bodies will be able to engage in dialogue with the
CCJ. In the case of the Working Party, the decision to reject the
proposals arose from the fact that up to the end of 1998, approx-
imately three-quarters of the preliminary questions referred,
came from first instance courts: " [T] herefore ... to deny access
to the Court ... for the national courts which have hitherto re-
ferred the great majority of preliminary questions would make
excessive inroads into the co-operation and dialogue which must
be maintained between national courts and Community
Courts." '1 7 7 The Working Party took the view that this kind of
reform could have a perverse effect at the national level.17 This
would occur by way of litigants being encouraged "or at least the
richer ones, to pursue their cases right through to the very high-
est courts in order to gain access to the Court of Justice by refer-
ring a question for a preliminary ruling."' 79 On the other hand,
in the words of the report, the "aim is definitely not to create
congestion in national courts of final instance."18
The idea was also floated that national courts be left to set-
175. Id. at 12.
176. Id. at 13.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. WP REPORT, supra note 173, at 13.
180. Id.
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tle all questions of Community law by themselves with the parties
only entitlement being to bring the national judgment "in a sort
of longstop appeal claiming breach of Community law."1"' A re-
jection of this approach was posited on the basis that national
courts should be able to deal with issues of Community law in
the exercise of their national jurisdiction by being "entitled or
obliged" to refer questions to the supreme judicial body, and
this without having to pass through a hierarchy of national
courts."1 8 2 In their own words to accept such a proposal would
be to: "debase the entire system of cooperation established by
the Treaties ... a system that has proved its worth."18 3
The analysis turned instead to other ways of reforming the
system and concomitantly reducing the caseload of the ECJ.
First of all, national courts should be encouraged to be bolder
in applying Community law themselves. This involved three di-
mensions (actually proposed in the report as Treaty amend-
ments):
* the first consists in stating the fundamental principle that
the courts of Member States have full authority to deal with
questions of Community law which they encounter, subject
only to their right or their duty to refer questions to the
Court for preliminary rulings.' 84
" the second consists of informing courts other than those of
final instance (for whom the only option is to refer), that
they must try not to refer questions systematically. When
assessing the advisability of referring a question such courts
"should consider both the importance of the question in
terms of Community law and whether there is reasonable
doubt about the answer. In other words they should be dis-
suaded from referring matters to the Court... where Com-
munity law clearly states what the answer should be or
where the point raised has no legal significance." 18 5
The WP Report points out that the notion of reasonable doubt
was already clarified in Cilfit v. Ministry of Healthl"6 and that it
would be for the ECJ to determine whether there needs to be
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 14.
185. Id. at 14-15.
186. See Case 283/81, [1982] E.C.R. 3415, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 472.
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greater flexibility in its application." 7 In terms of the notion of
significance for Community law, this fits in with the maxim de
minimis non curat preator 8 s Here again, it was for the Court,
when asked by national tribunals, to state the precise scope that
should be given to this notion. 8 9 It is appropriate to stress here
that the attitude towards both the acte claire and the significance
notions doctrines will be of some importance as the Caribbean
Court begins grappling with these problems.
The third dimension relevant to this discussion is stated by
the Working Party as follows: "the obligation is imposed on
courts of final instance to consult the Court... when a question
of Community law is raised before them. In practice, it has not
always been possible to follow such a rigid obligation. "' 90 With
that in mind, the Working Party expressed the belief that there
should be an obligation imposed upon courts of final instance to
refer only questions which are "sufficiently important for Com-
munity law" and about whose resolution there remains "reasona-
ble doubt" after having been examined by lower courts.'91
From the CARICOM perspective, this lack of rigidity already
exists in that while there is a duty to refer, the Court still has to
answer the question whether "it considers that a decision on the
question is necessary to enable it to deliver judgment.1' 92 If the
court makes a decision which the litigants believe is the incorrect
one, they have the option of having a higher court make the
reference to the CCJ or seeking to have that institution review
the decision under the direct contentious procedure provided
for in article 211. In fact, the Working Party went on to stress
that this approach would not pose a threat to the uniform appli-
cation of Community law.1 9 There would still be two ways of
remedying any breach by a court of final instance, at least where
such a breach resulted in a decision which conflicted with Com-
munity law:
187. See WP REPORT, supra note 173, at 15.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See Revised Treaty, supra note 2, art. 214 (stating that "the court or tribunal
concerned shall, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it
to deliver judgment, refer the question to the Court for determination before deliver-
ingjudgment") (emphasis added).
193. See WP REPORT, supra note 173, at 16.
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" the first is for any other court in the same or another Mem-
ber State to consult the Court... on the point of Commu-
nity law in question;
" the second is for the Commission to bring an action for
failure to fulfill its obligations against the Member State
whose court has shown ignorance of Community law.1 94
These remedies would also be available in the Caribbean Com-
munity context.
The WP Report also stressed that in the final analysis, the
Commission, as guardian of the Treaties, could ask the Court to
decide the question without setting any time limit.195 The result-
ing decisions would restore the uniform application of Commu-
nity law for the future.196
A fourth dimension emerges as well: this is the requirement
that a national court must consult the Court of Justice when it
proposes not to apply a Community act on the grounds of inva-
lidity. The Group took the view that this should be incorporated
in the Treaty. While we are still some time away from that stage,
it is arguable that through recourse to the CCJ by the commu-
nity organ or institution concerned, a Member State or natural
or legal persons with locus standi could operate to cure this de-
fect.
In terms of irrelevant, premature, or poorly-prepared refer-
ences, and those which concern only the specific application of
Community law and not its interpretation, the Working Party
proposed that "mandatory provisions, failure to comply with
which would render references inadmissible should be incorpo-
rated in the rules of Procedure." '197 These could be supple-
mented with recommendations from the Court, including possi-
bly a standard model for the formulation of references.
This proposal appears suitable for the CCJ as it would assist
in the institution setting out on the correct footing. Two other
suggestions eminently suited to the Caribbean context involve
provisions being placed in the Rules of Procedure:
i) the option of the regional judicial body replying at any
stage in the procedure, to the national court, by means of
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. WP REPORT, supra note 173, at 17.
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reasoned order where the reply is obvious. An example
where this approach would be applicable includes where
there can be no reasonable doubt as to interpretation.'
ii) Secondly, encouraging national courts, but not obliging
them, to include in the preliminary questions reasoned
grounds for the answers that those courts consider most
appropriate. Where the regional court concurs, it would
reply specifying its reasoning by reference to the reasons
given by the national court.1 99
The report was quite anxious to point out that the essential pur-
pose of the proposals was to allow national courts to be better
placed to give informed decisions on the growing number of
Community law issues facing them. On the other hand, only the
most resolute action on the part of Member States could secure
this objective. The action envisaged by the Working Party is of
"direct applicability" to the Caribbean Community in the thrust
to establish its own Court of Justice.200
Two focal points for action by Member States were identi-
fied:
[F] irst, there is an urgent need to give better training in Com-
munity law to all those involved in referring questions for pre-
liminary rulings, be they judges or lawyers. The training
should be complete and not just - as is too often the case at
the moment - confined to a description of the Community
institutions, without a detailed study of the case law.2°1
While there is still no "case law" in a judicial sense, in respect to
CARICOM, the fact is that the regional universities and the Or-
gans of the Community, together with the Private and Public Bar
and the Judiciary, should be engaged in seminars, symposia and
short and long courses on the CSME and the implications for its
establishment with a judicial body to oversee compliance with its
rules. The case law of other regional integration movements
could then be applied, as appropriate, to assess possible courses
of judicial action in respect to specific rights and obligations.
Moreover, "powerful information systems should be made
available to practitioners, providing them with easy access to the
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. Id. at 19.
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latest information on Community legislation and case law."2 °2
In line with the actions envisaged, the WP Report recommended
that:
the Member States set up national information centres on
Community law, with computer links to the Commission's de-
partments and to the Court of Justices's Research and Docu-
mentation Service. Run by experienced specialists in Com-
munity law, these would give invaluable aid to national judges
and lawyers to enable them gradually to settle, under proper
conditions, an increasing number of difficulties themselves,
which for lack of adequate information they currently refer to
the Court of Justice. 20 3
While the Project Co-Ordinating Unit for the Establishment of
the CCJ has made certain proposals to the Regional Judicial and
Legal Services Commission research and documentation issues,
the truth is that this linkage to the national dimension is not
articulated therein. Adoption of this idea, generalized across the
two facets of the CCJ's jurisdiction, would make a signal contri-
bution to the enhancement of the justice systems in the Member
States of CARICOM.
The foregoing represented the reformist proposals ad-
vanced. There were more radical suggestions as well. They are
being reproduced here to ensure the completeness of the discus-
sion. Three such proposals were advanced, two of which could
be seen as relevant to the current context. These are that "the
Member States might set up devolved judicial bodies specializing
in preliminary rulings; and the Court might select certain ques-
tions from among those referred to it."2 °4 The setting up of the
devolved courts at the national level was seen as having the ad-
vantages of relieving the ECJ of examining those preliminary
questions that were not specially important for the purposes of
Community law, as well as reducing administrative costs and
time lags - both major problems in our regional justice sys-
tems.
20 5
On the other hand, there were serious disadvantages. In
the first instance, the preliminary ruling procedure involves a
dialogue between the referring court, which is hearing the prin-
202. Id.
203. WP REPORT, supra note 173, at 19.
204. Id. at 20.
205. Id.
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cipal action and which alone is fully familiar with the case and
the Community court, which alone is capable of securing a uni-
form interpretation of Community law. It was felt that to inter-
pose another court between these two would jeopardize the ob-
jective of uniform application of the law, "even if the new court
were obliged to refer specially significant question to the Court
of Justice."2°6 There would now be three courts considering the
same issues in succession, thereby prolonging the proceedings.
The view was also taken that the outcome would be essentially
the same even if the questions were first submitted to the re-
gional court for assessment with the less important ones being
remitted to the devolved court.2° 7 In the latter scenario, a de-
gree of uniformity could be assured but the advantages of devo-
lution would be mostly lost in the process. 20 Another critical
disadvantage of this route is the fact that the administration of
devolved courts would entail heavy outlays in financial, human
and material resources, which are not available and could distort
the national court structure. 20 9
The other "radical" proposal involved giving the ECJ itself
the ability to select those preliminary questions that it felt were
sufficiently significant for the purposes of Community law. °
Other questions would be sent back to the referring court "possi-
bly with observations that could help national judiciaries," a pro-
cedure similar to that which obtains in the practice of the U.S.
Supreme Court.2 1 ' The report took the view that, while this
would be simple, effective, and economical:
[S]uch an arrangement cannot be transposed at present to a
system of courts which is radically different from the United
States: unlike the American system, the Community courts
and national courts are not ranked in a hierarchical relation-
ship to each other - the system is based entirely on coopera-
tion and dialogue .... It is this cooperation and dialogue
which would be upset by such a crude form of selection as
that just described. 212
206. Id.
207. Id. at 21.
208. Id.
209. WP REPORT, supra note 173, at 21.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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This "crude" proposal in the EU context is of direct rele-
vance in terms of the Caribbean Court ofJustice's relationship to
national courts, as there is indeed a hierarchical relationship
based on the article 221 requirement regarding precedent and
stare decisis. Ultimately it will be up to the President of the Court,
his colleagues on the bench and the RJLSC to work out some
model that can avoid some of the problems the European system
faced forty years after its establishment. One thing is certain;
the problems will come, here, much more quickly. In conse-
quence, there may be a future need for a less offensive selection
process. This would not go as far as devolution but would give
greater responsibility on national courts to carefully select refer-
ence questions. Additionally, it provides a filtration mechanism
which may be usefully adopted after the new institution has "cut
its teeth" into its tasks but before the envisaged "flood" of refer-
ences.
C. Advisory Opinions
1. Caribbean Court of Justice
Treaty article 212 grants the Court advisory opinion jurisdic-
tion: "The court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to deliver advi-
sory opinions concerning the interpretation or application of
the Treaty.12 13 The CARICOMjudicial authority can deliver said
opinions "only at the request of the Contracting Parties or the
Community. "214 This will indeed provide a very powerful tool by
which the organs and institutions of the Community can pro-
mote the growth and development of its legal order, even if
Member States are reluctant to use this procedure. In addition,
there is already something of a clamor for the category of enti-
ties to which this procedure is available to be widened to include
natural and legal persons. The rationale for the latter proposal
is that within the Member States, Constitutional Courts can and
are requested to give opinions on important issues by way of ref-
erences. The Draft Rules (Original Jurisdiction) deal extensively
with this procedure.
One may compare the CCJ's advisory opinion jurisdiction
with two other tribunals: first, the European Free Trade Area
Court of Justice (the "EFTA Court"). Given that this institution
213. See Revised Treaty, supra note 2, art. 212.
214. Id.
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is less well known than the other tribunals discussed, it is appro-
priate to provide a brief background. The EFTA Court was es-
tablished by the Members of that regional economic grouping
who are parties to the European Economic Area ("EEA") Agree-
ment of 1992 and which entered into force in 1994.215 The
EFTA was established in 1960 by the Stockholm Convention,
three years after the Treaty of Rome constituting the European
Communities entered into force. 2 16 The Agreement itself was
between the then twelve members of the European Communi-
ties and the EFTA States Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechten-
stein, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.217 Since that time Aus-
tria, Finland and Sweden joined the European Union on January
1, 1995. Switzerland and Leichtenstein did not join the EEA
Agreement but the latter acceded on January 1, 1995.18
The EFTA Court originally had five judges but is now com-
prised of three appointed by the governments of Iceland,
Leichtenstein and Norway. The key instruments constituting
this tribunal, which are important for present purposes, are the
EEA Agreement 219 and the Agreement between the EFTA States
on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of
Justice ("ESA/CJ Agreement"). 22' Article 108(2) of the former
requires that the EFTA States shall establish a Court of Justice
(the EFTA Court) 221 It continues:
The EFTA Court shall, in accordance with a separate agree-
ment between the EFTA States, with regard to the application
of this Agreement be competent, in particular, for:
(a) actions concerning the surveillance procedure re-
garding EFTA States;
(b) appeals concerning decisions in the field of competi-
tion taken by the EFTA Surveillance Authority;
(c) the settlement of disputes between two or more
215. See What is EFTA?, State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, at http://www.seco-
admin.ch/themen/aussenwirtschaft/efta/was/?lang=en (last visited Feb. 12, 2004)
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. EFTA Secretariat, The European Economic Area ("EEA") Agreement at
http://secretariat.efta.int/Web/EuropeanEconomicArea/EEAAgreement/EEAAgree
ment (last visited Feb. 12, 2004) [hereinafter EEA Agreement].
220. The Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveil-
lance Authority and a Court of Justice, OJ. L 344 (Dec. 31, 1994) [hereinafter EFTA
Surveillance and Court Agreement].
221. EEA Agreement, supra note 219, art. 108(2).
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EFrA States.
2 22
Protocol 34 to this instrument allows EFTA States the facility of
making references to the ECJ where the EEA Agreement rules
are identical to those of the European Communities.223
The ESA/CJ Agreement highlights article 108(2) in its pre-
amble and then goes on:
RECALLING the objectives of the Contracting Parties to the
EEA Agreement, in full deference to the independence of the
courts, to arrive and maintain a uniform interpretation and
application of the EEA Agreement and those provisions of
the Community legislation which are substantially repro-
duced in that Agreement and to arrive at an equal treatment
of individuals and economic operators as regards the four
freedoms and the conditions of competition.224
After all, when the idea of this accord emerged in 1984, it was
envisaged as creating a European Economic Space. Part IV of
the ESA/CJ Agreement deals with the judicial institution. Arti-
cle 27 establishes the Court and adds that it "shall function in
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and of the
EEA Agreement. '22' Article 32 confers jurisdiction, which shall
be in actions "concerning the settlement of disputes between
two or more EFTA States regarding the interpretation or appli-
cation of the EEA Agreement, the Agreement on a Standing
Committee of the EFTA States or the present Agreement. "226
Article 34 is the advisory jurisdiction provision: "The EFTA
Court shall have jurisdiction to give advisory opinions on the in-
terpretation of the EEA Agreement. ' 227 The ECJ model is fol-
lowed in that " [w] here such a question is raised before any court
or tribunal in an EFTA State, that court or tribunal may, if it
considers it necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the
EFTA Court to give such an opinion."221
In juxtaposition to the EU context, it is necessary to modify
the application of this procedure in respect of the EFTA States,
for reasons including the absence of supra-nationality in the re-
222. Id.
223. See id.
224. EFTA Surveillance and Court Agreement, supra note 220, at pmbl.
225. Id. art. 27.
226. Id. art. 32.
227. Id. art. 34.
228. Id.
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gime. In consequence, the third paragraph of this article gives
the State some discretion to limit the procedure: "An EFTA
State may in its internal legislation limit the right to request such
an advisory opinion to courts and tribunals against whose deci-
sions there is no judicial remedy under national law."22 9 In
other words, the Member State may consider it desirable to ex-
tend to all its courts the authority to make the request or it may
curtail that authority to the level of last instance courts and tribu-
nals. The determining factors here would include the domestic
judicial hierarchy as well as other constitutional law features.
Also, unlike in the EU and CARICOM, EFTA is also an entity
that enjoys the right to request an opinion from the ECJ - an
external tribunal.
In terms of the European Court of Justice, however, the ad-
visory opinion jurisdiction has been placed in the context of the
external relations of the Communities: article 300(6) of the
Consolidated Version stipulates:
The European Parliament, the Council, the Commission or a
Member State may obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice
as to whether an agreement envisaged is compatible with the
provisions of this Treaty. Where the opinion ofJustice is ad-
verse, the agreement may enter into force only in accordance
with Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union.23
0
The cited article authorizes the Commission or a Member State
to propose amendments to the constituent instruments of the
Union. However, it also sets up a process of consultation and
the convening of an Inter-Governmental Conference. The
Court is placed as the final arbiter in terms of the respective ar-
eas of treaty-making competence of the institutions of the Com-
munity and individual Member States. This is borne out by arti-
cle 107(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the ECJ. It states:
The Opinion may deal not only with the question of
whether the envisaged agreement is compatible with the pro-
visions of the EC Treaty but also with the question whether
the Community or any Community institution has the power
to enter into that agreement.23
1
229. Id.
230. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 160, art. 300(6), OJ. C 325/33, at 151
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 139 (ex Article 228).
231. Rules of Procedure of the Court ofJustice of the European Communities, art.
107(2) (1991).
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On the other hand, the Member States can be impugned
under other provisions for breach of their obligations if they
conclude treaties deemed incompatible with the laws of the
Community. It may therefore be concluded that the EFTA
model uses the advisory opinion procedure to achieve the same
effect as the preliminary ruling procedure of the EU. The Carib-
bean Community has opted to employ both but it has reserved
the former procedure for use by the Community and Member
States. Nothing prevents the CCJ from being asked to pro-
nounce on the treaty-making power of the Community under
the Revised Treaty. Therefore, the advisory procedure in CAR-
ICOM may be used for the purposes sought to be achieved in
the EU, as the following demonstrates.
The Conference is empowered under article 12 (3) to con-
clude treaties: "Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, the
Conference shall be the final authority for the conclusion of
treaties on behalf of the Community and for entering into rela-
tionships between the Community and international organiza-
tions and States."
The Community has concluded a large number of treaties
and there are also intra-Community inter-governmental agree-
ments. 2 3 2 In addition, the Conference may also "consult with en-
tities within the Caribbean Region or with other organizations
and for this purposes may establish such machinery as it consid-
ers necessary. 233
While this grant of authority is clear, it is possible for future
litigation to arise on the issue of whether a bilateral arrangement
concluded by a Member State or a group of such States (e.g., the
OECS) directly or indirectly impacts upon the Community and
therefore arguably falls within the above competence.
Similarly, following the proposed text of some articles in the
Free Trade Area of the America's Draft Agreement, it will be
possible for Member States to enter into arrangements which im-
pact upon fundamental objectives of the Community. In that
situation, it could be argued to be an infringement of the Con-
ference's power. If this were to occur, the CCJ may be minded
232. The Community has concluded Free Trade Agreements with Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cuba, The Dominican Republic, and Venezuela. It negotiates with the European
Union as a group, within the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States ("ACP")
established under the Georgetown Accord at the time of the First Lome Convention.
233. Revised Treaty, supra note 2, art. 12, 9.
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to adopt the approach of the European Court in the ERTA
case. 234 The Court held:
To determine in a particular case the Community's authority
to enter into international agreements, regard must be had to
the whole scheme of the Treaty no less than to its substantive
provisions.
Such authority arises not only from an express conferment by
the Treaty ... but may equally flow from other provisions of
the Treaty and from measures adopted, within the framework
of those provisions, by the Community institutions.
In particular, each time the Community, with a view to imple-
menting a common policy envisaged by the Treaty, adopts
provisions laying down common rules.. .the Member States
no longer have the right, acting individually or even collec-
tively, to undertake obligations with third countries which af-
fect those rules.
As and when such common rules come into being, the Com-
munity alone is in a position to assume and carry out contrac-
tual obligations towards third countries affecting the whole
sphere of application of the Community legal system.235
Then the following key conclusion was drawn: "With regard to
the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty the system of
internal Community measures may not therefore be separated
from external relations. '' 236 All commentators agree that this
case and a subsequent line of similar decisions expanded the
range of implied powers of the EC objectively necessary in order
to avoid a disjunct between the fundamental internal objectives
and external imperatives required to put the latter into effect.
237
As discussed above, the Revised Treaty empowers the Su-
preme Organ to negotiate and conclude international agree-
ments on behalf of the Community. A Member State could re-
quest of the CCJ, by way of the advisory opinion jurisdiction, to
expatiate on the limits of that competence, vis-a-vis its own sover-
eign authority in the issue.238 On the other hand, the rules in
234. See Commission v. Council, Case 22/70, [1971] E.C.R. 263 (1971); see also
ARNULL, supra note 137, at 540-42.
235. Commission v. Council, at grounds 15-18.
236. Id. at summary 1.
237. See, e.g., ARNULL, supra note 137, at 540-42.
238. In fact, there was recent disagreement between two Member States with re-
spect to a soon-to-be-concluded FTA with a third State.
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article 80, which proved so difficult to negotiate and which cir-
cumscribes the treaty-making competence of members in their
bilateral relations with third States, groups of States or other en-
tities, can form the basis of litigation. Organs of the Community
or other Member States can allege breaches of those provisions
and request advisory opinions from the Court.
2. The Appellate Jurisdiction
A critical manifestation of the sui generis nature of the CCJ is
the fact that Part III of the Agreement covering this jurisdiction
is not mentioned in the Revised Treaty. The Commonwealth
Caribbean Member States (founders of the Community) have
taken and reiterated decisions, dating back to 1987, to establish
a final court of appeal in substitution for the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council. However, to the extent that in this emana-
tion the Court will be a municipal court of last resort, as I have
argued, there is some scope for disagreement with a thesis that
the CCJ is the judicial arm of the movement.
Professor Simeon McIntosh disagrees strongly with this "bi-
furcation." Speaking on the topic of legal education and the
CCJ he says:
I understand [the topic] to mean that we are asked to engage
in a critical rethinking of legal education in the region in
light of the coming into being of the CCJ to replace the Privy
Council, and also to exercise original jurisdiction .... I
should therefore wish to locate my discussion in a broader
conceptual context of an ideal conception of legal education
in the region that would best prepare our citizens for the
practice of law before the Court, for the practice of law as
judges and as academics, and for the practice of law as legisla-
tors and policy makers .... 239
But why this "broader conception"?
This sort of contextualizing, I believe, would help us over-
come an emerging perception of a bifurcated court - a
court of original jurisdiction requiring specialist judges to ad-
judicate matters pertaining to the operation of the CSME and
the interpretation of the Treaty; and a court of appellate ju-
239. Simeon C.R. McIntosh, LegalEducation and the CCJ, based on a presentation at
a Symposium on the CCJ in St. George's, Grenada (Sept. 23, 2003), at 2 (on file with
author).
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risdiction to address all cases in law and equity coming from
the [M] ember [S] tates' courts of appeal, and requiring differ-
ent skills from those relevant to the original jurisdiction
240
This Caribbean jurist prefers a holistic conception of the CCJ in
the following terms:
It is therefore submitted that the authoritativeness of the
Court would derive from the fact that it is to be the court of
final jurisdiction for the region. There are however matters
of such moment that we would not wish to entrust to the state
courts, in the first instance, given that we run the risk that
[S] tate courts may be too inclined to interpret the Treaty in a
manner favorable to the interests of their respective [S] tates.
Also it might be too long a process before we have a final and
binding decision on appeal from the [S]tate courts to the
CCJ. Assigning original jurisdiction to the CCJ . .. therefore
serves the critical values of certainty, efficiency and stability -
values that are indispensable for the successful operation of a
market economy such as the CSME.24 1
The correct approach is therefore taken with the setting out of
all the provisions relating to the municipal court in the Agree-
ment.
The CCJ Agreement recites the main constitutional provi-
sions of the Commonwealth Caribbean Members of the Commu-
nity, which all send final appeals to the Privy Council. The only
exception is Guyana, which terminated appeals to that body in
1966 and which now has to add a third appellate tier. This is
already provided for in the Constitution of that Member State.
The CCJ Agreement also allows for Member States to enter a
reservation to the appellate jurisdiction with the consent of the
Contracting Parties. 2
4 2
No reservation is allowed in respect of the original jurisdic-
tion under the CCJ Agreement. However, by virtue of article 237
of the Revised Treaty, reservations may be entered to Treaty pro-
visions with the consent of the signatory States.2 43 It is submitted
that a reservation in respect of judicial settlement of disputes
would be unacceptable as it would be incompatible with one of
240. Id. at 2-3 (emphasis in original).
241. Id. at 3-4.
242. See CCJ Agreement, supra note 103, art. XXXIX.
243. See Revised Treaty, supra note 2, art. 237.
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the fundamental objectives of the Treaty as required under the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Article XXV, paragraph 1 of the CCJ Agreement provides
that in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, "the Court is a
superior Court of record with such jurisdiction and powers as
are conferred on it by this Agreement or by the Constitution or
any law of a Contracting Party." '244 The distinct heads of appeal
are set out in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4:
2. Appeals shall lie to the Court from decisions of the Court
of Appeal of a Contracting Party as of right in the follow-
ing cases:
(a) final decisions in civil proceedings where the matter in
dispute on appeal to the Court is of the value of not
less than twenty-five thousand dollars Eastern Carib-
bean currency (EC$25,000) or where the appeal in-
volves directly or indirectly a claim or a question re-
specting property or a right of the aforesaid value;
(b) final decisions in proceedings for dissolution or nul-
lity of marriage;
(c) final decisions in any civil or other proceedings which
involve a question as to the interpretation of the Con-
stitution of the Contracting Party;
(d) final decisions given in the exercise of the jurisdiction
conferred upon a superior court of a Contracting
Party relating to redress for contravention of the pro-
visions of the Constitution of a Contracting Party for
the protection of fundamental rights;
(e) final decisions given in the exercise of the jurisdiction
conferred on a superior court of a Contracting Party
relating to the determination of any question for
which a right of access to the superior court of a Con-
tracting Party is expressly provided by its Constitution;
(f) such other cases as may be prescribed by any law of the
Contracting Party.
3. An appeal shall lie to the Court with the leave of the Court
of Appeal of a Contracting Party from the decisions of the
Court of Appeal in the following cases:
(a) final decisions in any civil proceedings where, in the
opinion of the Court of Appeal, the question involved
in the appeal is one that by reason of its great general
244. See CCJ Agreement, supra note 103, art. XXV, 1.
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or public importance or otherwise, ought to be sub-
mitted to the Court;
(b) Such other cases as may be prescribed by any law of
the Contracting Party.
4. Subject to paragraph 2, an appeal shall lie to the Court
with the special leave of the Court from any decision of the
Court of Appeal of a Contracting Party in any civil or crim-
inal matter.2
45
Consistent with the approach taken at the time of indepen-
dence in relation to matters such as citizenship and elections to
Parliament, paragraph 5 bars appeal on stipulated matters:
Nothing in this Article shall apply to matters in relation to
which the decision of the Court of Appeal of a Contracting
Party is, at the time of the entry into force of the Agreement
pursuant to the Constitution or any other law of that Party,
declared to be final.2 46
The Judicial Committee was, by virtue of this provision in the
applicable national Constitutions, barred from seizing itself of
jurisdiction over these matters. It is to be noted that this form of
constitutional bar has been proposed as a possible approach for
those Member States that have referenda or other challenging
constitutional requirement in emplacing the appellate jurisdic-
tion but who along with all the others have to give domestic legal
effect to the original jurisdiction. The possibility of the CCJ, as
the final appellate court of a Member State, being required to
refer matters to the Court as an international tribunal has al-
ready been discussed.
3. Institutional Distinctiveness
As regards the modalities utilized for appointing the Judges
and naming the President, it is incontrovertible that the Carib-
bean Court of Justice is the only international judicial tribunal
with an independent mechanism for carrying out these func-
tions. While the bench of all other international tribunals are
appointed by member governments either directly or via elec-
tions, the CCJ Agreement establishes in Article V a Regional Ju-
dicial and Legal Services Commission.2 4 7 Furthermore, in order
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. art. V.
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to reinforce the Court's insulation from the political executive,
there are no Government representatives on the Commission.
Its membership is as follows:
(a) the President who shall be the Chairman of the Commis-
sion;
(b) two persons nominated jointly by the Organization of
Commonwealth Caribbean Bar Association (OCCBA)
and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
(OECS) Bar Association;
(c) one chairman of the Judicial Services Commission of a
Contracting Party selected in rotation in the English al-
phabetical order for a period of three years;
(d) one chairman of a Public Services Commission of a Con-
tracting Party selected in rotation in the reverse English
alphabetical order for a period of three years;
(e) two persons from civil society nominated jointly by the
Secretary-General of the Community and the Director-
General of the OECS for a period of three years follow-
ing consultations with regional non-governmental orga-
nizations;
(f) two distinguished jurist nominated jointly by the Dean of
Faculty of Law of the University of the West Indies, the
Deans of Faculties of Law of any of the Contracting Par-
ties, together with the Chairman of the Council of Legal
Education; and
(g) two persons nominated jointly by the Bar or Law Associa-
tions of the Contracting Parties.248
Given that the President will chair the Commission, the
Agreement allows for the appointment of a "first-time" Commis-
sion. Under article VI, this is constituted "under the hand of the
Heads of Judiciaries of the Contracting Parties." 24 9 The Com-
mission has been inaugurated and is busy carrying out its
tasks .2 5 The tasks entrusted to this entity are set out in article V,
paragraph 3, they include:
(a) making appointments to the office ofJudge of the Court,
other than that of President;
248. Id.
249. Id. art. VI, I 2(b).
250. It should be noted that the travaux prparatoires of the negotiations leading up
to the signature of the Agreement will disclose that the various collegia set out were
encouraged to take note of the fact of membership of two countries with civil law sys-
tems.
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(b) making appointment of those officials and employees re-
ferred to in article XXVII and for determining salaries
and allowances to be paid to such officials and employ-
ees;
(c) the determination of the terms and conditions of services
of officials and employees; and
(d) the termination of appointments in accordance with the
provisions of this Agreement.251
Paragraph 3 also empowers the Commission to exercise dis-
ciplinary control over the Judges, other than the President, as
well as over officials of the Court.25 2 The disciplinary procedure
involves the constitution of a tribunal comprised of senior judi-
cial officers of the Contracting Parties. The tribunal hears the
matter and makes recommendations to the Commission. Article
IV, paragraph 7 sets out the procedure for appointing or remov-
ing the Judges. A majority vote of the Commission is re-
quired.253 With respect to the President, he shall be "appointed
or removed by the qualified majority vote of three quarters of
the Contracting Parties on the recommendation of the Commis-
sion. 2 4 Given the infamy of the unit veto in the Community,
the Agreement avoided requiring unanimity but did set a high
threshold. Accordingly, any head of State of a Contracting Party,
who opposes a nomination by the Commission has to secure the
concurrence of three-quarters of his or her peers. Additionally,
the heads of the Contracting Parties are precluded from substi-
tuting their candidate, if they negative a recommendation from
the Commission. They have to remit the matter to that body for
another recommendation. The President is appointed by letter
under the hand of the Chairman of the Conference, while the
Judges are appointed by letter under the hand of the Chairman
of the Commission, i.e., the President.
In terms of the sources from which the bench of the Court
can be drawn, article IV, paragraph 10 mandates that the candi-
date:
[I]s or has been for a period or periods amounting in the
aggregate to not less than five years, a Judge of a court of
unlimited jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters in the ter-
251. CCJ Agreement, supra note 103, art. V, 3(1).
252. Id. art. V, 3(2).
253. See id. art. IV, 7.
254. See id. art. IV, 6.
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ritory of a Contracting Party or in some part of the Common-
wealth, or in a State exercising civil law jurisprudence com-
mon to Contracting Parties, or a court having jurisdiction in
appeals from any such court and who, in the opinion of the
Commission has distinguished himself or herself in that of-
fice. 2
55
The Agreement does not exclude non-judicial jurists and sub-
paragraph (b) grants eligibility to persons engaged in the prac-
tice or teaching of law for periods of no less than fifteen years in
the aggregate. 256 The other stipulations set out above are appli-
cable.
It should be noted that even while speaking of developing
an "indigenous jurisprudence," allowance is made for members
of the bench to be drawn from outside of the Member States.
The possibility for candidates from civil law jurisdictions is self-
evident: Haiti and Suriname are full Members of the Commu-
nity. But in addition, it is not the feeling of those who crafted
the regime that the jurisprudence being sought to be created
necessarily involves any extreme notion of self-reliance - a sort
of legal autarchy. There are many examples of jurists coming
into the region from outside and making valuable contributions.
The difference with the Privy Council experience is that their
Lordships are writing law for societies they have great difficulty
in empathizing with in terms of cultural mores, socio-economic
and political values, and so on. This was recently openly admit-
ted by a Senior Law Lord, The Right Honorable Lord Leonard
Hoffman:
It is an extraordinary fact that for nearly nine years I have
been a member of the final court of appeal for the indepen-
dent Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, a confident democ-
racy with its own culture and national values, and this is the
first time that I have set foot upon the islands. No one una-
ware of the historic links between the islands and the United
Kingdom would believe it possible.
2 57
He then makes the following observation:
Although the Privy Council has done its best to serve the Car-
255. Id. art. IV, 10.
256. Id.
257. The Right Hon. Lord Leonard Hoffman, Speech at the Annual Dinner of the
Law Association of Trinidad and Tobago, at 5 (Oct. 10, 2003) (transcript on file with
author).
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ibbean and, I venture to think, has done much to improve
the administration of justice . . . our remoteness from the
community has been a handicap. We have been necessarily
cautious in doing anything which might be seen as inappro-
priate in local conditions and although this caution may have
occasionally saved us from doing the wrong thing, I am sure it
has also sometimes inhibited us from doing the right
thing.2
58
Of equal importance in terms of the need to acquire juristic
talent from outside the region, is the requirement in article LV
paragraph 1 that: "the Judges of the Court shall be the President
and not more than nine other Judges of whom at least three
shall possess expertise in international law including interna-
tional trade law."259 The fact is that, at the present time, neither
as products of the system of legal education nor within the ranks
of those engaged in the practice of law, could there be said to
exist a "surfeit" of international legal expertise. The Council for
Legal Education, spurred on by efforts of the Project Co-Ordi-
nating Unit, has recently tabled proposals to the Legal Affairs
Committee, which should see to the closing of this "deficit."
Another indisputable first for the CCJ is the mode of financ-
ing the Court. In order to allay fears that the institution may be
manipulated by the political executive through its financing, or
that its sustainability may be compromised, the Conference of
Heads of Government accepted a recommendation that a trust
fund be established. Hence, the Caribbean Court of Justice
Trust Fund (the "Trust Fund") was constituted by The Agree-
ment Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice Trust Fund.
Within that legally binding international instrument, the Con-
tracting Parties agree to the levels of financial contribution they
will make.
Technical studies were done leading to a finding that with
an investment of U.S.$100 million, the Court could be financed
sustainably, in perpetuity and thus secure its complete indepen-
dence. The Caribbean Development Bank ("CDB") was man-
dated to raise that amount on the international capital markets.
258. Id. The Association is, even at this stage of the process, on the record as
opposing the establishment of the Court.
259. CCJ Agreement, supra note 103, art. IV, 1.
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The Contracting Parties have agreed loans with the CDB in the
amount of their contribution to the budget of the Court.
Yet another unique feature of the regime is the composition
of the Board of Trustees. Again, there are no governmental rep-
resentatives. Instead, a number of pan-Caribbean entities were
invited to make nominations. All happily concurred. They are:
* the Secretary-General of the Community;
" the Vice-Chancellor of the University of the West Indies;
* the President of the Insurance Association of the Carib-
bean;
" the Chairman of the Association of Indigenous Banks of
the Caribbean;
* the President of the Caribbean Institute of Chartered Ac-
countants;
" the President of the Organization of Commonwealth Carib-
bean Bar Associations;
" the Chairman of the Conference of Heads ofJudiciaries of
the Member States of the Caribbean Community;
" the President of the Caribbean Association of Industry and
Commerce; and
" the President of the Caribbean Congress of Labour.
In structuring the Board of Trustees in this manner, greater pub-
lic confidence in the entire regime is engendered as there can
be no thought of governments manipulating these persons. In
fact several other regional bodies have requested to serve on the
Board.
One issue that has driven the affected members of the Car-
ibbean Community to begin the move away from the Privy Coun-
cil is the question of access to justice. The fact is only a small
number of persons can access the JCPC. The large corporations
that can afford it naturally wish the Committee to be retained.
In criminal cases, matters in forma pauperis form the bulk of liti-
gation, particularly death penalty cases. With that in mind, from
the earliest discussion of a regional court, it has been agreed that
while the CCJ would have a permanent seat in Port-of-Spain, the
capital of Trinidad and Tobago, it would operate as an itinerant,
peripatetic tribunal, like the former Federal Supreme Court and
the extant OECS Supreme Court. This is provided for in the
CCJ Agreement, article III, paragraph 3, which stipulates that
the Seat of the Court will be in the territory of a Contracting
Party as agreed by a qualified majority thereof "but, as circum-
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stances warrant, the Court may sit in the territory of any other
Contracting Party.
26 °
Finally, as regards compliance and specifically enforcement
ofjudgments, the CCJ Agreement requires the parties to take all
the steps necessary to have enforcement done on the same basis
as the decisions of their superior courts and to have all their
authorities act in aid of the Court.261
The distinctiveness of the Court would be further enhanced
if the Member States were minded to adopt proposals emanating
from the Expert Group of Heads of Government. On the nexus
between implementation and enforceability, they propose:
As regards enforceability, the [West Indian Commission] en-
visaged that the CARICOM Supreme Court (now the Carib-
bean Court of Justice .. .) would have the competence to is-
sue an Order of Implementation in appropriate cases involv-
ing the upholding of rights and duties under Community law.
We believe this to be the right conceptual approach.262
In fact, if this approach is conjoined with the adoption by
Member States of legislation similar in concept to the U.K.'s Eu-
ropean Communities Act, 1972,263 then the issue of supranation-
ality is avoided while the objective being sought is attained. The
Expert Group of Heads of Government favors this approach:
In its Report, the West Indian Commission had set out how [a
system of enforcement] could work through draft Instru-
ments of Implementation and appropriate national legisla-
tion. The system would lead to the development of a coher-
ent body of Community law. It is a system under which the
[Executive] Commission would prepare a Draft Instrument
.. to give effect to (or, sometimes to facilitate the making of)
a Community Decision. That "draft" Instrument of Imple-
mentation [then] would be formally approved (with or with-
out modification) by Heads of Government or other compe-
tent body.264
The Instrument would be "declaratory of rights and duties aris-
ing under the Decision," but it would not "itself have statutory
260. Id. art. III, 3.
261. See id. art. XXVI.
262. Regional Integration, supra note 4, at 4.
263. EC Act, supra note 150.
264. Regional Integration, supra note 4, at 4.
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effect." '2 65 This gap would be closed by a revision of the Revised
Treaty:
Governments would undertake to enact national legislation
(perhaps through a basic 'CARICOM Act' in each member
country) which would give legal effect in that country to the
rights and duties arising under [all] Instruments of Imple-
mentation. This would be the way in which a body of Com-
munity law would be developed consistent with CARICOM re-
maining a Community of Sovereign States .... 266
The European Union, in the drive to transform itself from a
Community into the Union, utilized the modality of the Single
European Act, 1986.267 This was a treaty but its provisions were
to be ratified en bloc by the Member States. The Caribbean Com-
munity may not wish to adopt that approach but rather have an
identical piece of draft legislation for its Member States to enact.
With that in mind, we may examine the provisions of the EC Act,
in which the U.K. enacted the supranationality of the European
Community into its municipal domain.2 68
As is known, in the U.K., the majority of international legal
obligations contracted by the Crown have to be incorporated
into municipal law before they can bind the citizens. (In rare
cases, some treaties may produce self-executing effects, and rules
of customary international law whether in a treaty or not, are
binding erga omnes.) The Interpretative provision of the EC Act
lists EC instruments affected by the legislation and defines
"treaty" to include "any international agreement, and any proto-
col or annex to a treaty or international agreement."269 Section
2, entitled "General Implementation of Treaties," is the main op-
erative provision. It prescribes as follows:
(1) All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restric-
tions from time to time created or arising by or under the
Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures from
time to time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in
accordance with the Treaties are without further enact-
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Single European Act 1986, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [here-
inafter SEA] (amending Treaty establishing European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11).
268. EC Act, supra note 150.
269. See id. § 1(4).
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ment to be given legal effect or used in the United King-
dom shall be recognized and available in law, and be en-
forced, allowed and followed accordingly; and the ex-
pression "enforceable Community right" and similar
expressions shall be read as referring to one to which this
subsection applies.
270
The U.K. was thus able to retain Parliamentary Sovereignty,
while faithfully adhering to the obligations it had contracted
into, upon accession into the supranational Community. The
spirit of the Governance proposals being advanced in the Carib-
bean Community clearly requires that the Member States be pre-
pared to adopt a similar approach. The "enforceable Commu-
nity rights" are of obvious significance for natural and legal per-
sons as it is these rights in the Revised Treaty constituting the
CSME that will form the subject matters in actions before munic-
ipal courts - to which the referral procedure would apply -
and in instances where natural or legal persons apply for special
leave to have the CCJ determine their grievances.
In the EU, the Court of Justice has, from the outset, been
very determined that Member States comply with their obliga-
tions. Thus in an early, precedent-setting judgment Commission
v. Italy, it affirmed:
In permitting Member states to profit from the advantages of
the Community, the Treaty imposes upon them also the obli-
gation to respect its rules.
For a State unilaterally to break, according to its own
conception of national interest, the equilibrium between ad-
vantages and obligations flowing from its adherence to the
Community brings into question the equality of Member
States before Community law and creates discrimination at
the expense of their nationals, and above all of the nationals
of the State which places itself outside the Community
rules.
27 1
As Professor Arnull observes, following the judgment, "it is no
defense that national legislation, although technically incompat-
ible with Community law, is in practice applied in accordance
with the requirements of the Treaty. '2 72 This in fact "gives rise
270. Id. § 2(1).
271. Commission v. Italy, Case 39/72 [1973] E.C.R. 101; see ARNULL, supra note
137, at 26-27.
272. ARNULL, supra note 137, at 26-27.
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to an ambiguous state of affairs by maintaining, as regards those
subject to the law who are concerned, a state of uncertainty as to
the possibilities available to them of relying on Community
law.7
2 7 3
Subsection 2 of Section 2 of the EC Act goes on to provide
the procedural route by which future rights and obligations can
pass into the municipal domain without the need for primary
legislation. Thus, a Regulation, Order-in-Council, or an act of a
designated Minister or Department may make provisions:
(a) for the purpose of implementing any Community obliga-
tion of the United Kingdom, or enabling any such obliga-
tion to be implemented, or of enabling any rights en-
joyed or to be enjoyed by the United Kingdom under or
by virtue of the Treaties to be exercised; or
(b) for the purpose of dealing with matters arising out of or
related to any such obligation or rights or the coming
into force, or the operation from time to time, of subsec-
tion (1) above. 274
Careful note is to be taken of the subtle draftsmanship. The
"rights enjoyed or to be enjoyed" inure to the benefit of the
United Kingdom, and then through it, to natural and legal per-
sons.2 75 There is also a very interesting rider that qualifies the
two provisions by empowering or giving discretion to the persons
exercising the statutory authority granted: that person "may
have regard to the objects of the Communities and to any such
obligations or rights as aforesaid." 276 Of course, it is the case and
it has often happened that where the discretion is not exercised
or is exercised improperly in relation to Community law, either
the Commission of the Communities or the Court of Justice has
intervened to correct the situation.
It is also important to cite, in part, Section 3 entitled "Deci-
sions on, and proof of, Treaties and Community Instruments
etc.":
(1) For the purposes of all legal proceedings any question as
to the meaning or effect of any of the Treaties, or as to the
validity, meaning or effect of any Community instrument,
shall be treated as a question of law (and, if not referred to
273. Id.
274. EC Act, supra note 150, §2(2).
275. Id.
276. Id. §2(2).
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the European Court, be for determination as such in accor-
dance with the principles laid down by and any relevant deci-
sion of the European Court) 277
The section goes on to require that judicial notice be taken of
the Official Journal of the Communities as well as of "any deci-
sion of or expression of opinion by the European Court" on any
question mentioned in the previous provision.2 7 ' This provision
accords substantively with the discussion above on the issue of
the legal quality of Community law within the municipal domain
as opposed to municipal law in matters before the regional
court.
It is submitted that the Caribbean Community could imagi-
natively adapt this piece of legislation to craft its own "Single
CARICOM Act" and therein include by reference or directly pro-
visions relating to the jurisdiction of the CCJ in relation to Or-
ders of Implementation.
CONCLUSION
The Caribbean Community is at a very critical stage of its
development. After being in existence for thirty years and being
the oldest regional integration regime among developing coun-
tries, it has accepted the challenge to reach a higher level of
engagement involving the rule-based approach. This approach
permeates the Revised Treaty. As with the results of the Uru-
guay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, attempts were
made to ensure legal symmetry in the entire regime, including
the Dispute Settlement provisions. The Caribbean Court of Jus-
tice sits at the top of the dispute settlement "totem pole." This
institution, in addition to having the responsibility of interpret-
ing and applying the Revised Treaty, is also the court of final
instance for the Commonwealth Caribbean Members of the
Community in place of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council in London. Uniquely, the cycle of independence is be-
ing completed and sovereignty affirmed by these States, while at
the same time, in setting up the CCJ as the regional court, they
are volitionally ceding aspects of that sovereignty in order to
greater facilitate the economic and social development of their
people.
277. Id. §3(1).
278. Id. §3(2).
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The sui generis CCJ is quite deserving of accolade for its legal
and institutional architecture. The hope is that it will be deserv-
ing of even greater accolade as it carries out this challenging task
and so truly enhances the law of international organizations.
